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

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

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

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THE
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
ON LAND, 1904—1905

AUGUST 24 TO OCTOBER 30, 1904

BY

J. H. ANDERSON, F.R.HIST.SOC.

BARRISTER-AT-LAW; LATE LECTURER AT KING'S COLL., LONDON; SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE IN INDIAN CIVIL AND HOME CIVIL (CLASS I.) EXAMINATIONS; LECTURER ON MILITARY HISTORY AND STRATEGY AT 5, LEXHAM GARDENS, W., AND LATELY AT THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION

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PREFACE

THIS account of this period of the land operations of this great struggle is based upon the following authorities: Ross's "Development of Tactics"; *Times* "History"; Sedgwick; "Militär Wochenblatt" (comments not equal to the author's reputation); Ian Hamilton's book; de Négrier; Balck's "Tactics"; German Official Account (comments excellent and much used); British Official Account (essential); Bird's "Strategy of Russo-Japanese War" (excellent).

For Port Arthur and the Baltic Fleet I find I must wait for the second volume of the Naval and Military Account, not yet published.

As few places as possible are mentioned, and the spelling is that of the British Official Account; Roman figures are employed to denote Russian troops, and Arabic figures to denote Japanese troops.

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NOTE.—Ho = River; Shan = Mountain; Ling = Pass.

I would urge all students of this war to read carefully the B.O.A., the G.O.A., and Bird's book.

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LIST OF DATES

Aug. 24. to Sept. 5. Battle of Liao-yang.

Sept. 5. 1st Brigade of Guard crosses Tai-tzu Ho.

Sept. 10. Russians round Mukden.

Sept. 17. Japanese north of Tai-tzu Ho.

Sept. 28. Kuropatkin issues orders for battle.

Oct. 4 to 17. Battle of the Sha Ho.

Oct. 30. Winter Quarters.

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The Russo-Japanese War on Land, 1904—1905

CHAPTER I

CAUSES OF THE WAR

JAPAN had a general cause as well as a special cause of war. Generally speaking, she had a cause of war, because, on looking round the world, she saw herself the only independent power that was not European or European-derived, and she also saw that independence could be maintained by military power, and by that alone.

Her special cause of war lay in the facts that Korea was vital to her expansion, and that Korea was aimed at by Russia, whose great object was and is to obtain an ice-free harbour, whether in Korea or elsewhere. She was furious because, after she had captured Port Arthur in 1894, France, Germany, and Russia had compelled her to give it up, and the Siberian railway seriously alarmed her. In 1897 Russia secured the right of connecting that railway with the Pekin line at Port Niu-chuang (Ying-kou), and also a lease of Port Arthur (an ice-free port) for 25 years and the right of building a line from Port Niu-chuang to that fortress.

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Then came the Boxer outbreak, 1900, which gave Russia an excuse for occupying Manchuria, and the reply was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902, effectually forestalling any such combination as in 1895 had deprived Japan of the fruits of her victory. Japan then set to work to expel Russia from Manchuria; but in August, 1903, the railway to Port Arthur was completed and began pouring in troops. Even Northern Korea was aimed at, for a timber concession on the R. Ya-lu granted to a Russian was worked by a retired colonel and ex-soldiers, equipped with rifles. The Japanese Government protested, but the Siberian railway was improving and Russian vessels were arriving; and on December 11, 1903, Russia replied, offering to discuss with Japan the Korean question, but not the Manchurian question. The result was that on February 6, 1904, the Mikado broke off diplomatic relations. Neither side declared war till February 10, 1904. China, urged by the United States, proclaimed her neutrality, which, as well as her frontier, was generally respected throughout the war; as to Korea (independent since 1895), Japan speedily made a friendly arrangement with her. As a fact the war came two months too soon for Japan, and two years too soon for Russia.

Diplomacy and strategy should go hand in hand; with Japan they did, with Russia they did not.

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CHAPTER II

THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

RUSSIA had two naval bases—Port Arthur, open all the year, and Vladivostok, ice-bound for three months; they connected, *vid* Tsushima, a fortified Japanese island. As Vladivostok was nearly isolated from the Pacific Ocean, Port Arthur was far the more important harbour, but with bad dock accommodation. As to dock accommodation for repairs, Japan had the advantage.

Korea was of value, because through it lay the road to Manchuria, which latter is mountainous in the south and east, and, except in the extreme south, covered with dense forest. In the west of the province, however, lie the rich plains of the Liao R. and the Sungari R. The climate is continental—*i.e.* hot in summer and cold in winter. As to diseases, both armies knew how to take care of themselves, and, as to the population, it objected only less to the Japanese than it did to the Russians. The Japanese, however, whilst objecting to war-correspondents, and, like their enemies, using cavalry very little for intelligence

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work, obtained better information through their spies and the inhabitants; the Chunchuses (professional robbers), indeed, constantly raided the Russian communications.

The principal rivers in the theatre are the Ya-lu, the Sungari, the Amur, the Liao, all navigable when not frozen, and then they are sleigh-routes. Though villages are numerous, roads in the proper sense do not exist; it is possible to move along them with some ease during the winter, but in the rest of the year they are very difficult. The so-called roads are: (1) Port Arthur to Harbin; (2) the Mandarin road from Seoul *viâ* Liao-yang to Pekin; (3) cross-roads from Pi-tzu-wo and Ta-ku-shan into the Port Arthur road. Both Japanese and Russians found the roads serious evils in spite of coolies and Chinese carts, and, worse than all, the Japanese rolling-stock did not fit the Port Arthur to Harbin railway, the gauge on which had to be altered.

General de Négrier suggests that, to keep up a sufficient supply of ammunition and food, a modern army should possess refrigerating plant and portable railway *matériel*.

Supplies of various kinds were abundant in the theatre—in fact, all that was required except tea, sugar, flour, and oats—and thus the railways were left free for troops and ammunition. Mongolia supplied cattle, at Fu-shun and Yen-tai were coal-mines, whilst pigs, fowls, rice, vegetables, and

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crops of tall grain, called by various names, such as gaoljan, millet, sorghum, kao-liang, Indian corn, abounded.

The Japanese were based on their own country, Ujina being the principal dépôt, the Russians on Europe and on Siberia; and, though the Liao R. was a fair line of communication, the railways deserve first place. These must now be enumerated: (1) Chemulpo to Seoul; (2) incomplete line from Fusan to Seoul, which, during the war, the Japanese extended to Wiju; (3) Pekin to Hsin-min-tun, with a branch to Port Niu-chuang, which, under Belgian control, helped the Russians at first and the Japanese afterwards; (4) the all-important Siberian single-track line, which covers 6,000 miles from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, with branches to Strietensk, Khabarovsk, Port Arthur, Port Niu-chuang (Ying-kou), and Yen-tai. From Europe the quickest transit occupied fifteen days, but forty days between Warsaw and Mukden was not unusual. The difficulty of returning empty waggons was met by using them as fuel or as huts in Manchuria, new waggons built at Moscow costing less than returning the old ones: the engines, of course, were returned by means of sidings. Still, this long railway was always a weak point and inferior to the Japanese sea-transport; and the fact that rice was their staple food helped the Japanese commissariat.

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One special difficulty was Lake Baikal, round the southern end of which ran no railway in February 1904. Across this great lake were used passenger-steamers, steam-ferries, ice-breakers, or sledges, according to the weather; but during a thaw crossing was almost impossible, and in that case troops marched round the southern end, supplies only being shipped across; while ice lasted the men marched across it. To get enough engines and waggons in the Far East, rails were, in February 1904, laid across the ice of the lake, and by March 28 over 60 military trains were thus passed over. The extraordinarily able Russian Minister of Public Traffic, Prince Khilkof (Chilkow), did much (in spite of the prevalent corruption) to improve the transport, and on September 25, 1904, finished the Circum-Baikal line; and by the end of 1904 the Trans-Baikal system ran nine or ten trains daily each way, and up to the same date the railway had carried 410,000 men, 93,000 horses, 1,000 guns, etc. (a European Russian army corps requires 267 railway trains). It should be added that the railway was well guarded in Manchuria, and that every possible precaution for the health of the men *en route* was taken. The fact that most of the food could be locally obtained was no doubt a great help.

N.B.—From Vladivostok to Port Arthur is 625 miles, and from Wiju to Fusan is 400 miles;

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the war took place in neither belligerent's territory; the Russians laid down several light railways during the operations; a telegraph line skirted each railway, and ran from Seoul to Gensan.

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CHAPTER III

THE FORCES

THE Japanese standing army consisted of the Imperial Guard, 12 Divisions (each containing 11,400 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 36 guns), 2 cavalry brigades (3,000 men altogether), and 2 artillery brigades (180 guns). To this force must be added 13 Kobi brigades—a Kobi brigade contained 3,500 infantry, and a mixed Kobi brigade, *e.g.* Umezawa's, contained 5,000 infantry and 18 guns. During the war were raised four new divisions and four new Kobi brigades, but as a rule the Japanese preferred to strengthen existing units. It should be noted that the division was the highest unit, that there were no corps d'armée, that a battery consisted of six guns (note that Divisions 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 had only mountain-guns), and that lines of communication were held by Kobi and dépôt troops. The supply system was, shortly, as follows: A private carried one day's rations and two days' emergency rations; then came the regimental transport carrying one days' supplies; then the

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divisional supply column carrying four days' rations; and then the magazine column, which filled from railhead or other dépôt, and to this latter the supplies came from the sea-base.

The system was much the same as in Germany, the Emperor being Commander-in-Chief. Marshal Yamagata acted as Chief of the General Staff, whilst Marshal Oyama held chief command in the field. Oyama was much aided by his talented Chief of Staff, Baron Kodama. The training and "moral" were excellent, the war popular, the initiative was inculcated, and the men's bravery was hereditary—in short, they retained the virtues of barbarism without the defects of civilisation. The infantry, armed with modern rifles, believed in fire-action both in attack and on defence; they knew how to use ground, employing artificial cover even on the offensive, and learnt how to conduct night-attacks; they went into action carrying 250 rounds, and moved rapidly from cover to cover. The cavalry, few and badly mounted, were the weakest point (this remark does not apply to Akiyama's 1st Cavalry Brigade); the inferiority of the horses accounted for the defective reconnaissance work, for the absence of raids, for the want of mobility displayed by the field-guns, and for the failure to pursue. The cavalry were too much tied to the infantry and the Japanese, unlike the Russians, were bad horse-masters. The

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artillery, having some quick-firing guns not quite up to date, was not equal to the infantry, and neither side at first possessed protective shields—*i.e.* not till after the Sha Ho. It will be observed that the victor possessed inferior numbers, but Japan has since seen fit to increase her army.

The strength of a European Russian corps was 28,000 infantry, 3,400 cavalry, and 124 guns; but a Siberian corps was nothing like so well organised and had no cavalry, nor was there any divisional cavalry. The cavalry consisted almost entirely of Cossacks, each division containing 3,400 men and 12 horse-artillery guns in two batteries; the Russian field battery numbered 8 guns, and the horse-artillery battery 6 guns.

The infantry, obstinate as ever, had forgotten the lessons of the Russo-Turkish War, 1877–8, believed not in fire-action, but in shock tactics —*i.e.* the bayonet, "without sufficient use of skirmishers and without enough fire-preparation" (G.O.A.), in spite of their modern rifles. Initiative was discouraged, units were mixed up, simultaneous flank and frontal attacks were not suggested, reserves were too much held back. Like their opponents, they carried 250 rounds. As to cavalry, there were few trained horsemen, hence bad reconnoitring, for the Cossacks were poor soldiers, untrained, and unable either to read or to write. As to artillery, Russia was rearming with quick-

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firing guns, superior to her opponent's, but the mountain-guns were very few; reserve artillery was unwisely formed, guns were not massed, and the practice was inferior. The staff was not properly trained, and the Russians generally, who never take kindly to the offensive, lacked "moral" for this unpopular war.

The supreme command was not satisfactory. In Manchuria and round Port Arthur it was vested by land and sea in Admiral Alexeiev, the Governor of the Far East; in the Amur district it was vested in General Linevich; at Port Arthur itself General Stessel commanded. On February 20, 1904, a very able general, Kuropatkin, had been named Commander-in-Chief of the Army. On October 27, 1904, Alexeiev was recalled; but up to that date the supreme command was unsatisfactory.

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CHAPTER IV

THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG

THE general result of the campaign up to the end of July was that the Russians stood from August 2 to 22 east, south, and south-west of Liao-yang in two masses: (1) the Eastern Front, under Bilderling, from Hsiao-hsi-kou to the northern bank of the Tai-tzu Ho—III. S.A.C., X. A.C., and XVII. A.C.; (2) the Southern Front, under Zarubaiev, at An-shan-chan—I., II., and IV. S.A. Corps. The link between the two was formed by Mishchenko till August 19, when he retired to Liao-yang, and his place was taken by two mixed detachments. General Liubavin and Colonel Grulev were at Pen-hsi-hu, and more to the east, near Ching-ho-cheng, Madritov's Detachment, whilst on the west, in the Liao Ho valley, stood Kossakovski's Detachment—Madritov and Kossakovski took no part in the Liao-yang fighting; in Port Arthur were the IV. and VII. East Siberian Rifle Divisions, with the Russian fleet; and finally, at Mukden, was the V. S.A.C. The total of the effectives near Liao-yang ran up to 140,000, with 474 field-guns, 50

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horse or mountain guns, 6 field-mortars, and 16 machine-guns. These numbers were increased during the Liao-yang fighting.

In front stood the Japanese, likewise in two masses, separated by 30 miles—on the right, on the Lan Ho, Kuroki's 1st Army (46,000), with Guard Kobi troops on his right-rear protecting the communications against Liubavin and Madritov; on the left Oku's 2nd Army (48,000), including the 11th Kobi Brigade, and Nodzu's 4th Army (31,000), including the 10th Kobi Brigade, near Hai-cheng; total of Japanese ran up to 125,000, of whom 110,000 were infantry, and these numbers were not increased during the Liao-yang fighting. Round Port Arthur were Togo's fleet and Nogi's 3rd Army.

In detail Kuropatkin had the XVII. A.C. under Bilderling, X. A.C. under Sluchevski, IV. S.A.C. under Zarubaiev, III. S.A.C. under Ivanov, II. S.A.C. under Zasulich, I. S.A.C. under Stakelberg, and Independent Cavalry—Cossacks of Grekov, Mishchenko, Samsonov, Rennenkampf, and the Caucasian Cavalry of Prince Orbeliani. On the other side, Oyama had the 2nd Army, consisting of the 3rd, 4th, and 6th Divisions, 11th Kobi Brigade, 1st Cavalry Brigade, and 1st Field Artillery Brigade (three Artillery regiments), with some mortars and howitzers; the 4th Army, consisting of the 5th and 10th Divisions, and 10th Kobi Brigade; and the 1st Army, consisting of the

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12th, 2nd, and Guard Divisions, and Guard Kobi Brigade.

During this period, August 2 to 22, communications were improved, dépôts established at Chiao-tou, etc., the 2nd Army's base shifted to Ying-kou, but the 4th Army's base remained at Ta-ku-shan, and the 1st Army's at An-tung. The Japanese plan was to move concentrically on Liao-yang on August 18, but they delayed, because it rained heavily, and because they hoped the 3rd Army would capture Port Arthur and march to assist in the battle. They were well informed about the Russians, whereas the latter overestimated Kuroki, supposing him to have the 9th Division (really at Port Arthur), and Nodzu, supposing him to have the 8th Division (really in Japan), and consequently Kuropatkin planned to hold Liao-yang on the defensive; but about August 23, after the arrival of all the XVII. Army Corps and the V. Siberian Army Corps, he took a view much more in favour of the offensive.

TIME-TABLE OF THE BATTLE

Aug. 24 *to Sept.* 5. *Battle of Liao-yang.*
Aug. 24 *to* 28. *Actions on the Eastern Front.*
Aug. 24. Guards advance.
Aug. 25. Guards attack till 4.30 p.m.
Aug. 26. Battle of An-ping, which Guards begin at 5.30 a.m. and their artillery fires till 8 p.m.

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3.30 a.m. 2nd and 12th Divisions attack.

11 a.m. Column 2 of the 12th Division takes the Kitsuritsu San.

3 p.m. Klembovski wounded.

6 p.m. His troops fall back.

8 p.m. Yanjul given to Sluchevski.

12 mid. Kuropatkin orders retreat.

Aug. 27. 3 a.m. X. A.C. retires.

1.30 p.m. 2nd and 12th Divisions slowly pursue.

3 a.m. III. S.A.C. retires.

11 a.m. Guard pursues.

Aug. 28. 10 a.m. Guard moves.

12 noon. 2nd Division wades through Tang Ho.

Aug. 24 *to* 28. *Actions on the Southern Front. Battle of An-shan-chan.*

Aug. 25. 10th Division advances.

Aug. 26. 5th Division and 2nd Army advance.

Aug. 27. 5 a.m. Zarubaiev retires on the Sha Ho.

3 a.m. 2nd Army advances.

Aug. 28. 2nd and 4th Armies advance. Rear-guard actions; Zarubaiev on Liao-yang.

Aug. 29 *to Sept.* 5. *Actions round Liao-yang itself.*

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Aug. 29. Russians round Liao-yang. Japanese in presence.

Aug. 30. 5.30. a.m. Guns open. 10th Division and Guard attack till 12 noon. 2nd Army and 5th Division attack.

8 p.m. Fighting ceases.

Aug. 30 to 31. Oku's night-attacks.

Aug. 31. 12th Division and half 2nd cross the Tai-tzu Ho.

Aug. 31 to Sept. 1. Russians retire.

Sept. 1. 12 mid. Okasaki carries Manjuyama.

Sept. 2. 8 a.m. Dobrjinski's attack on Manjuyama.

1 p.m. Orlov retreats.

7 p.m. and 10 p.m. Russian attacks on Manjuyama, and 2nd and 4th Armies attack Liao-yang.

Sept. 3. 4 a.m. Kuropatkin renounces the offensive.

3 p.m. Kuroki calls up the Guard.

12 mid. 2nd and 4th Armies occupy Liao-yang.

Sept. 4. 1 a.m. Russians all out of Liao-yang.

Sept. 5. 1 a.m. 12th Division attacks I. S.A.C. Russians retreat.

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ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG, AUGUST 24 TO SEPTEMBER 5

Liao-yang was a strategic point surrounded by fields of gaoljan.

ACTIONS ON THE EASTERN FRONT, AUGUST 24–28

After Yu-shu-ling and Yang-tzu-ling (July 31) the Russian Eastern Front retired behind the Lan Ho and held a front from Hsiao-hsi-kou to the north bank of the Tai-tzu Ho; III. S.A.C. on the right, X. A.C. on the left, XVII. A.C. in rear at Liao-yang, all under Bilderling. Troops detached at Pen-hsi-hu guarded the left, and the total numbers were 85,000, with about 359 guns.

Opposite stood the 1st Army along the Lan Ho, Guards on the left, 2nd Division in the centre, 12th Division on the right, Guard Kobi Brigade on the right rear.

August 24.—Guards advanced, their cavalry on their left wing, and skirmished with Russian advanced troops. August 24.

August 25.—Guards entrenched in front of the III. S.A.C. August 25.

August 26.—Battle of An-ping. After desperate efforts the Guards made no headway and remained in a dangerous position facing the III. S.A.C. August 26.

As to the X. A.C. nothing occurred on August 24 and 25, but on August 26 the right of this corps was driven back by the 2nd Division, whilst

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the 12th Division in four columns repulsed the centre of the X. A.C., but made no progress against the left of that corps till 6 p.m. Soon afterwards part of the XVII. A.C. reinforced the X. Corps' left, but at 12 midnight Kuropatkin directed the whole corps to retire behind the Tang Ho.

August 27. August 27.—At 3 a.m. the X. A.C. began to retire on Liao-yang, practically unmolested; at the same hour the III. S.A.C. began to retire also on Liao-yang, very little molested by the Guards.

August 28. August 28.—The Guards pursued, fighting severe rear-guard actions with the III. S.A.C. Meantime the X. A.C. retired attacked on its right by the 2nd Division, which waded through the Tang Ho, but the 12th Division remained east of that stream.

ACTIONS ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT: BATTLE OF AN-SHAN-CHAN, August 24–28

Zarubaiev held the An-shan-chan position with the I. S.A.C. on the right, and the II. S.A.C. on the left, and in reserve the IV. S.A.C. and Samsonov's Cossacks. Total numbers were about 60,000, with 200 guns. The left was in danger because it did not connect with the Eastern Front.

Opposite stood the Japanese at Hai-cheng; on the left the 2nd Army, and on the right the 4th Army.

August 25. August 25.—The Japanese began to advance.

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August 26.—The Russian advanced guards fell back. August 26.

August 27.—By Kuropatkin's orders Zarubaiev withdrew on to the Sha Ho covered by rear-guards; Japanese followed to An-shan-chan. August 27.

August 28.—The Japanese advanced attacking the rear-guards and reaching the Sha-Ho, whilst Zarubaiev retired on to the Liao-yang position. August 28.

ACTIONS ROUND LIAO-YANG ITSELF, AUGUST 29 TO SEPTEMBER 5

August 29.—In the outer line and in the inner line of defence Kuropatkin now had 135,000 infantry, 16,000 cavalry, and 596 guns, including the newly arrived V. S.A.C., against 115,000 infantry, 4,500 cavalry, and 450 guns. August 29.

The first line was held by Kossakovski's detachment on the extreme right in the Liao valley, and by troops on the extreme left at Pen-hsi-hu. On the right stood I. S.A.C.; in the centre III. S.A.C. and X. A.C.—all south of the Tai-tzu Ho; on the left, north of the river, XVII. A.C. In reserve IV. S.A.C. and II. S.A.C., with half the V. S.A.C. (the other half under Orlov being some miles in rear on the railway) and Samsonov's Cossacks. The immediate right of the I. S.A.C. was covered by Mishchenko.

August 30.—Japanese converged, 1st Army on the right, 4th Army in the centre, 2nd Army on the left. After gun-fire the 2nd Division, the August 30.

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Guard, and the 10th Division assailed the X. A.C. and the III. S.A.C. without success.

The 5th Division and the 2nd Army vigorously but fruitlessly attacked the I. S.A.C.

August 31. August 31.—The 12th Division and half the 2nd crossed the Tai-tzu Ho and entrenched opposite the left of the XVII. A.C. South of the river half the 2nd Division and the Guard and the 10th Division could do nothing against the X. A.C. and the III. S.A.C., whilst the 5th Division and the 2nd Army failed against the I. S.A.C. That evening Kuropatkin ordered retirement.

September 1. September 1.—The Russians retiring collected all their forces on the north bank except Dembovski's LXXI. Division of V. S.A.C., IV. S.A.C., and II. S.A.C. in the city itself. The 2nd and 4th Armies south of the river bombarded Liao-yang, whilst at night the 2nd Division north of the river stormed Manjuyama.

September 2. September 2.—The XVII. A.C. attacked Manjuyama without success, and Orlov, moving south from the Yen-tai mines, was repulsed towards Yen-tai by the 12th Division, but the Guard could not cross to the north bank and the Guard Kobi troops, though they drove the Russian detachment from Pen-hsi-hu, could not approach the Yen-tai mines. The 2nd and 4th Armies still attacked Liao-yang. Further unsuccessful assaults were delivered on Manjuyama.

September 3. September 3.—Kuropatkin ordered retreat on

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Mukden, and at midnight the 2nd and 4th Armies mastered Liao-yang. On the north bank the Guard Kobi troops from Pen-hsi-hu approached the Yen-tai mines, as the Russians everywhere retired.

September 4.—Half the Guard crossed the river, but the Japanese north of the river did not actively pursue. September 4.

September 5.—The retreat began in earnest, covered by Mishchenko. September 5.

THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG, AUGUST 24 TO SEPTEMBER 5

Liao-yang is a large town and a strategic point, being at the junction of two main roads, and on the railway, and possessing a great dépôt. Dense and tall gaoljan hampered both sides, and rendered marching dependent on the compass; the Russians broke it to knee-height to a distance of 700 yards, "creating thus an imperfect view and field of fire" (G.O.A); to the Japanese it was cover, but rendered marching difficult. It was densest on the western side. The whole Russian front extended 55 miles and was too extensive.

ACTIONS ON THE EASTERN FRONT, AUGUST 24–28

After Yu-shu-ling and Yang-tzu-ling (July 31), the Russian Eastern Front retired behind the Lan-Ho, and held a front from Hsiao-hsi-kou to the north bank of the Tai-tzu Ho; III. S.A.C. on the right, X. A.C. on the left, XVII. A.C. in rear at Liao-yang, all under Bilderling.

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The III. S.A.C. stood on the ridge north of Lang-tzu-shan, strongly entrenched with concealed gun-pits, with telephones, telegraphs, etc., and in rear rallying positions. The defects of the position were its great length (8 miles), and its splitting up into three sections by the Tang Ho and its tributary the Hsi-ta Ho, and the right wing was somewhat *en l'air*.

The above corps facing south-east held the position thus: right sector of three battalions and 24 guns under Colonel Lechitski, its exposed right flank secured by a small detachment under Colonel Drujinin at Tun-hsin-pu; central sector of five and three-quarter battalions and 36 guns under General Krechinski; left sector of five and three-quarter battalions and 12 guns under General Danilov. In front were advanced troops and outposts; the General Reserve was part under General Kashtalinski, behind the junction of the right and centre, and part under General Mardanov, behind the junction of the left and centre. To the south, on the extreme right at Lao-tien-tan, stood General Grekov's mixed detachment (infantry, Cossacks, and one horse mountain battery) connecting with the two mixed detachments which linked the Southern and Eastern Fronts.

Then came the X. A.C. facing east stretching to the Tai-tzu Ho: its entrenchments were not so well made as the III. Corps', and the extent

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of the position (12½ miles) was too great. The X. C. thus held its position: right sector under General Gershelmann, under whom Riabinkin commanded his right and Prince Orbeliani his left—the troops were the IX. Infantry Division, one mountain battery, a cavalry regiment and two Cossack squadrons; the left sector was held by Colonel Klembovski, with one infantry regiment, eight guns and two Cossack squadrons. The strong General Reserve, having at least 50 guns, stood under General Vasiliev in second line. The whole position of this corps was weakly held.

As a General Reserve of the Eastern Front, the XVII. A.C. stood east and south-east of Liao-yang, having the III. Infantry Division north of the Tai-tzu Ho, Colonel Grulev's detachment (relieved on August 27 by part of the LIV. Division of the V. S.A.C., Grulev then retiring to Yen-tai Station. His force included the 11th regiment of the III. Infantry Division, the other three regiments, 9, 10, 12, being north of the Tai-tzu Ho, as stated), guarding the left at Pen-hsi-hu, and the XXXV. Infantry Division south of the Tai-tzu Ho. Total numbers on the Eastern Front were 85,000, with 343 field and 16 H.A. guns, and many of the Russian guns were quick-firers.

On August 25 General Bilderling, at Kuropatkin's request, instructed the III. S.A.C. and X. A.C. to resist with tenacity. On the other

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side Kuroki had already decided to pierce the Russian centre by a night attack August 25–26; the 1st Army was standing along the Lan Ho, Guards at Ta-wan on the left, 2nd Division in the centre, 12th Division near the Yu-shu-ling pass on the right, Guard Kobi Brigade at Chiao-tou on the right rear, and on August 22 the General directed his second division to attack before daybreak on August 26, and the two wings later on in the same day.

August 24. August 24.—With a general idea of the enemy's position, gained from spies and patrols, the Guards early this day reached the following positions: 2nd Brigade Hou-lang-kou on the right; 1st Brigade Pian-dia-wan on the left; Guard Cavalry covering this wing. There was some skirmishing with Grekov and Drujinin, and on hearing of it Kuropatkin suggested to Ivanov, commanding III. S.A.C., that he should prolong his right wing for fear of envelopment.

August 25. August 25.—The Commander-in-Chief was right; the Guards pressed forward on their left, Drujinin slowly retiring from Tun-hsin-pu northwards to Tai-hsiang-tun, and Grekov also retiring from Lao-tien-tan northwards to Ta-hsi-kou. The Japanese then entrenched—2nd Brigade east of Tai-hsiang-tun, 1st Brigade east of Tun-hsin-pu, and cavalry south of Lao-tien-tan. There was not much gun-fire, and operations closed about 4.30 p.m.

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August 26.—Battle of An-ping. General Hasegawa, commanding the Guard, arranged that the 2nd Brigade, on the right, should hold the enemy, and that the 1st Brigade, on the left, should attack the Russian right south of Kao-feng-ssu, whilst on the extreme left the Guard Cavalry and the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (detached from the 2nd Division), would move north-west and try to connect with the 4th Army. August 26.

On the other side Ivanov had decided to extend and strengthen his right, which he did by moving into position north of Ta-hsi-kou, and on the right of Lechitski part of his General Reserve, Drujinin's detachment and Grekov's detachment. All the right sector, including Lechitski, was placed under Kashtalinski, and in addition Ivanov called up parts of the XXXV. Infantry Division of the XVII. A.C. (an interference acquiesced in by Bilderling). At daybreak, 5.30 a.m., the fight began all along the line: on the Japanese right the 2nd Brigade carried on a containing fire action against Krechinski's central sector of the III. S.A.C., the gun-fire here at very long ranges; on the Japanese left the 1st Brigade opened ten batteries at 6 a.m. against five Russian batteries, some batteries on either side being under cover and using indirect fire. This artillery duel lasted with violence till 3 p.m., doing, however, little actual damage; a storm then stopped the gunners, but on its ceasing the guns opened again until 8 p.m.

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Meantime the infantry of the 1st Brigade had, with loss, pushed north of Ta-hsi-kou, whilst on the extreme Russian right arrived Colonel Martinov with part of the XXXV. Infantry Division. This officer, aided by Grekov and Drujinin and the Reserve troops, then delivered a counter-attack both on the left flank and on the front of the 1st Brigade. The result is in dispute; we may, however, assume that the Russians succeeded in driving the left of the 1st Brigade from the heights north of Ta-hsi-kou, but not in routing the whole of that brigade.

At 3 p.m. Hasegawa decided to relieve the 1st Brigade by making on its right a frontal attack with three reserve battalions, whilst Ivanov sent some reserve troops to strengthen Kashtalinski, who repulsed this frontal attack. At 6 p.m. the Guards were reinforced by the 29th Kobi Regiment which, greatly exhausted, reached Tun-hsin-pu. All this time the 2nd Brigade maintained a hot fire on Krechinski's central sector. The whole combat was indecisive, leaving the Guard in a dangerous position.

In front of the X. A.C. nothing occurred on August 24 and 25, and so on the latter day Bilderling instructed Sluchevski to attack next day towards Hou-chia-pu-tzu so as to relieve the III. S.A.C., but the Japanese were too quick, their 2nd Division delivering a night attack, August 25 to 26.

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August 26.—This division had carefully reconnoitred, and the orders were that the right column under Okasaki and the left column under Matsunaga should attack at 4.30 a.m. through Hou-chia-pu-tzu and Hsia-hsi-kou respectively. This meant an assault on Gershelmann's right under Riabinkin.

Okasaki, with the right column, attacked at 3.30 a.m. (an hour before the appointed time), deceiving the Russians by a demonstration through Hou-chia-pu-tzu on the Kung-chang Ling pass, and moving in strength south of those places; the enemy fell back on Tsu-kou.

The left column, under Matsunaga, had a more difficult task; it moved on Hsia-hsi-kou and began the attack at 4 a.m., moving in silence, as had the right column. Matsunaga's right met heavy volley fire and suffered much, but he brought up his reserve and carried the position at 4.45 a.m.; Matsunaga's left was severely resisted, and it was not till 11 a.m. that this wing, aided by two mountain guns and by reserve troops sent by General Nishi (commanding the 2nd Division), carried the Russian position. The Russian centre, however, had not been pierced.

In spite of army orders on August 22, General Inouye (commanding the 12th Division) decided to attack at night; his right was covered by the Guard Kobi Brigade, which moved from Chiao-tou to the Tai-tzu Ho opposite Pen-hsi-hu. The 12th

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Division moved at night, August 25 to 26, in four columns from the north, thus: No. 1 column through Tschao-tsia-pu-tsy; No. 2 column through Hun-scha-gou; No. 3 column on the An-ping Ling pass; No. 4 column on the S. Pa-pan Ling pass. Some troops were held in reserve, and the 12th Cavalry Regiment covered the northern column north of Tschao-tsia-pu-tsy. There was thus no close connection with the 2nd Division.

The two southern columns—Nos. 3 and 4—moved against Orbeliani; No. 4 column at 5 a.m. stormed at the point of the bayonet, without firing, the S. Pa-pan Ling pass; column No. 3, also using the bayonet, at 4 a.m. stormed the An-ping Ling pass.

The two northern columns had not fared so well; they moved against Klembovski, and both were seriously resisted and the combat became stationary.

In the morning of this day, August 26, the 1st Japanese Army stood thus: on the left the Guard preparing to attack; in the centre the 2nd Division and the two southern columns of the 12th Division had captured the enemy's positions at the passes; on the right the two northern columns were being sternly resisted. As to the Russians, they moved the General Reserve of the X. A.C. into the rear of the main position, and into the same position slowly retired Riabinkin and Orbeliani covered by artillery. General Ger-

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shelmann was put in control of the sector from the left of the III. S.A.C. to An-ping, and General Vasiliev in control of the sector from An-ping to the Tai-tzu Ho.

As to the rest of this day's fighting accounts differ; probably the 2nd Division and columns 3 and 4 of the 12th Division merely used their guns against the far stronger Russian artillery, and in the north columns 1 and 2 of the 12th Division engaged in a violent fire-action, the guns on both sides being very active. At 11 a.m. column 2 gained the Kitsuritsu San, and at 3 p.m. the wounding of Klembovski was a bad thing for the Russians; soon afterwards column 1 succeeded in pushing forward, and at 6 p.m. the Russians with the loss of one battery fell back to the line Hei-yu—Ku-sao-chang. The Japanese did not pursue. The 1st Army had gained no real success.

Sluchevski, seeing the danger to his left, repeatedly asked for Yanjul's Brigade, which was still north of the Tai-tzu Ho; but, in fact, Bilderling had not a free hand, for Kuropatkin told him that, it not being certain where Kuroki's mass would strike, it was absolutely necessary to retain some infantry north of the river. When, however, Sluchevski reported the retreat of his left and the loss of the battery, Bilderling at 8 p.m. gave him Yanjul's Brigade, which therefore was moved to Ku-sao-chang. Sluchevski with Kuropatkin's approval then directed Yanjul to deliver a night

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attack, but it did not come off, because Kuropatkin at 12 midnight telegraphed that the X. A.C. should retire behind the Tang Ho, the III. S.A.C. having also been ordered to retreat, and it having also been suggested to Zarubaiev on the southern front to evacuate An-shan-chan. This sudden order for retreat was caused partly by Bilderling's report as to the two corps and partly because Kuropatkin always disliked the extended position on the Tang Ho.

No. 1 chance for the Russians.

Just before this order Bilderling could have successfully attacked, for he had 60,000 infantry, 2,700 horse, and 302 guns against Kuroki's 36,000 infantry, 1,200 horse, and 114 guns. There was no combination between the two Russian corps, each looked after itself; the Russians did not use all their artillery, and the order to retreat was an error. Kuroki, who had displayed such caution on the Ya-lu, extended his troops with such daring that he can be defended only by pleading his knowledge of Russian passivity.

August 27.

August 27.—At 3 a.m. orders for the X. A.C. to retire were issued. The troops were to cross the Tang Ho in the direction of Liao-yang, except that Yanjul was to recross to the northern bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. A storm on the afternoon of the 26th had rapidly swollen the Tang Ho, but the water abated as rapidly, and by 1.30 p.m. Gershelmann had crossed unmolested, and at 2.40 p.m. Vasiliev crossed by the pontoon south of Ku-

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sao-chang, also unmolested. In the evening of this day, August 27, the X. A.C. stood between Tang-shan and Keng-chia-tun-hsi-kou, Gershelmann on the right, Vasiliev on the left, with the General Reserve on the left rear. Yanjul passed over to the north bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, and on the morning of August 28 joined the rest of the XVII. A.C.

Rain and fog in the morning stopped any pursuit, but between 1 and 2 p.m. the 2nd Division began to press on towards An-ping and south of it, and that night the division reached the Tang Ho. The 12th Division also stood fast in the morning, though it could have damaged the Russian left while crossing the pontoon; in the afternoon columns 3 and 4 of the 12th Division pushed to An-ping and north-east of it, but columns 1 and 2, which could have pursued with effect, stood fast east of Pei-kou.

In the south opposite the Guard the III. S.A.C., on Kuropatkin's orders, began to retreat about 3 a.m. in the direction of Liao-yang, Kashtalinski, in the right sector, being somewhat pressed by the Japanese, but Krechinski, in the central sector, and Danilov, in the left sector, retiring quite easily. The movement lasted till well on into this day. The Guard was hampered by the fog, and it was 11 a.m. before the 2nd Brigade on the right began to push on Kao-feng-ssu, near which it had a severe fire-action with the Russian

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rear-guard, the latter using indirect fire but firing too high, whereas the Japanese fired accurately. Meantime, on the left, the 1st Brigade and the 29th Kobi regiment made for Chang-chiao-pu, driving back Grekov's detachment.

This evening the mass of the III. S.A.C. was well on the way to Liao-yang, the following troops in order from the west covering the retreat: Grekov, Drujinin, Reserve troops, Lechitski, Glinski, Mardanov. This evening, too, the 1st Army learnt that the Russian Southern Front had evacuated An-shan-chan, and that the 2nd and 4th Armies were in pursuit.

August 28. August 28.—At 10 a.m. on Kuroki's left the Guard marched from Kao-feng-ssu in two columns —the right (2nd Brigade) north-westwards, the left (1st Brigade) also north-westwards; the extreme left (Guard Cavalry and 2nd Cavalry Regiment) sweeping to the left in order to connect with the 4th Army; the rest of Hasegawa's troops (the 29th Kobi Regiment, etc.), as reserve behind the right column. This meant pressing the outer flank of the III. S.A.C.; it was correct tactics, but it failed because Ivanov also diverged north-westwards, and because the 4th Army did not appear.

The right column found itself opposed by Lechitski near Shih-chiao-tzu, which was not carried till 6 p.m.; the left column partly turned northwards and had a severe action with Lechitski,

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who retired at 6 p.m., and partly moved on Hsiang-shan-tzu, which at 10.30 p.m. was found evacuated by Grekov, Drujinin, and the Reserve troops.

Meantime the mass of the III. S.A.C. retired into the entrenched position south-south-east of Liao-yang. To prevent the Guard and the 4th Army from pushing in between the Southern and the Eastern Front, Kuropatkin posted a mixed detachment under General Dobrjinski, and Mishchenko's Cossacks on the right of the III. S.A.C.

As to the X. A.C., Kuropatkin directed that it was to resist on the west bank of the Tang Ho, especially on its left near Shih-chu-tzu, whither Vasiliev was to retire. On the right, south of that officer, Gershelmann was to take post, much reduced by Kuropatkin recalling half his infantry, but even thus he was, at Ivanov's request, instructed to retire slowly, so as to cover the left of the III. S.A.C.; in consequence the 2nd Division managed to assail Gershelmann.

Fog prevented the 2nd Division from using its guns till 9 a.m., when they opened on Gershelmann, and at 12 noon the infantry advanced, wading through the Tang Ho, whereupon the Russian retired his troops into his assigned position. He then found his numbers too few to connect with Vasiliev, and his left was therefore in danger of being enveloped by the 2nd Division. Soon afterwards Vasiliev, unattacked, withdrew into his

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assigned position, whilst Gershelmann, alarmed for his left, fell back into the main position near Ya-yu-chi.

As a fact the 2nd and 12th Divisions did not vigorously pursue; the left of the 2nd Division did indeed push into the position just vacated by Gershelmann, but the right halted just west of the Tang Ho, and the 12th, with unwise slowness, moved east of the Tang Ho, facing towards the Tai-tzu Ho. Thus the III. S.A.C. and the X. C. had ably retired into the main position.

ACTIONS ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT: BATTLE OF AN-SHAN-CHAN, August 24–28

Zarubaiev held the following positions: I. S.A.C. under Stakelberg, east and west through An-shan-chan with two advanced guards, the right under Zikov, the left under Kondratovich, with the Corps Cavalry under Gurko between these advanced guards. On the left of the I. S.A.C. stood the II. S.A.C.—that is, only the V. E.S.R. Division under Zasulich, with two advanced guards on the south and south-east, the right under Prince Troubetzkoi, the left under Colonel Tolmachev (these were the mixed detachments that had taken Mishchenko's place on August 19, but had failed to connect with the III. S.A.C.). To the north of the I. S.A.C. stood the General Reserve of the Southern Front—*i.e.* IV. S.A.C. and Samsonov's Cossack Division. In the gap between

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Kondratovich and Troubetzkoi stood another advanced guard, under General Rebinder. Total numbers were about 60,000, with 160 field, 24 H.A., and 16 machine guns.

The hills at An-shan-chan, running across the railway and road, had been turned into a defensive position with 16 redoubts, 12 batteries, and a good field of fire to the south and west in spite of the gaoljan, but the left could be turned through the mountains. Therefore the same error was committed as on the other front, an excessive extension, for the front measured eight miles in a straight line. Zarubaiev saw the danger, and especially the evil of the gap between the Southern and Eastern Fronts, which gap Kuropatkin could not fill from want of numbers, though Zarubaiev did send eastwards a weak detachment, under Colonel Posokhov, to try to effect this result.

As to the Japanese, the 2nd Army stood at Hai-cheng in this order from the west: 1st Cavalry Brigade, 4th Division, 6th Division, 3rd Division, 1st F.A. Brigade, some mortars and 11th Kobi Brigade; the 4th Army stretched eastwards, 5th Division, 10th Division, and 10th Kobi Brigade; and the object of these two armies was to envelop the enemy's left.

August 25.—The right of the 4th Army—the 10th Division—advanced north with the 10th Kobi Brigade as General Reserve. August 25.

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August 26. August 26.—The left of the 4th Army—the 5th Division—started; the 2nd Army moved along the railway. The result was that the 1st Cavalry Brigade moved against Zikov, the 4th Division against Gurko, the 6th Division with the 1st F.A. Brigade, and the 3rd Division with the 11th Kobi Brigade against Kondratovich, the 5th Division against Rebinder, and the 10th Division and 10th Kobi Brigade against Troubetzkoi.

After some gunfire the 2nd Army entrenched, whilst the 5th Division also engaged in artillery fire with Rebinder. Meantime the right column of the 4th Army drove Troubetzkoi, after a severe resistance, and Tolmachev, without difficulty, back on the II. S.A. Corps' main position, whereupon the latter officer was dispatched by Zasulich with some Cossacks eastwards to cover his left.

This day Zarubaiev moved the III. S. Inf. Div. of the IV. S.A.C. into position between the left of the I. S.A.C., and the right of the II. S.A.C., the II. S. Inf. Division of the IV. S.A.C. and Samsonov's cavalry remaining as before. The retreat of Troubetzkoi and Tolmachev uncovered Rebinder, who therefore was recalled, as also were Kondratovich, Gurko, and Zikov, all retiring northwards to the main position.

August 27. August 27.—Zarubaiev at 4 a.m. was instructed by Kuropatkin to retire on the Sha Ho (not the river where the battle occurred—that lies north

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of Liao-yang), which movement he therefore ordered at 5 a.m. Samsonov's cavalry in the centre withdrew well to the north of the Sha Ho; the IV. S.A.C. also in the centre on the Mandarin road just north of Sha Ho village; the II. S.A.C. on the left also north of the river, the I. S.A.C. on the right found its retreat hampered by bad roads and heavy rain, a rear-guard under General Rutkovski occupying the old main position, and by the evening one column, under Gerngross, was north of the Sha Ho, on the right of the IV. S.A.C.; but the columns of Kondratovich and Zikov halted south of the river, with Rutkovski's rear-guard between them and the railway, and with Gurko's cavalry south-south-west of them. Close to Rutkovski, but east of the railway, stood the IV. S.A. Corps' rear-guard under Kossovich. The retreat of the II. S.A.C. was covered by a rear-guard and to the south-south-east by Tolmachev's Cossacks and a rifle regiment (all three under Tolmachev), whilst Posokhov's detachment escaped by retiring well by the east. The retreat of the Southern Front had thus far been conducted without fighting, and on the evening of this day Zarubaiev had a telegram from Kuropatkin, which meant "stop on the Sha Ho."

On the Japanese side the 2nd Army at 3 a.m. moved to attack Zikov, Gurko, and Kondratovich, but found they had retired. Owing to a fog the Japanese did not at once discover the retire-

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ment, which frustrated their idea of enveloping the Russian left, and it was evening before the An-shan-chan position was reached—3rd Division and 11th Kobi Brigade on the right at An-shan-chan; 6th Division and 1st F.A. Brigade in the centre; 4th Division on the left; 1st Cavalry Brigade on the extreme left. The same evening the 4th Army had its left, 5th Division, east of An-shan-chan, and its right, 10th Division, still more eastwards, with the 10th Kobi Brigade in the rear.

August 28. August 28.—Both Japanese armies moved at night, August 27 to 28, in pursuit; the left and centre of the 2nd Army slowly on account of the roads; the right of that army and the left of the 4th Army more quickly, as also the right of the last army along the Sha Ho valley, circling round well to the east. Zasulich in consequence retired his II. S.A.C. about 6 a.m. without informing Zarubaiev. This retreat uncovered Kossovich—rear-guard of the IV. S.A.C.—who at 5 a.m. was attacked by the 3rd and 5th Divisions, the latter enveloping his left.

Zarubaiev at once ordered a retreat on Liao-yang, but finding the I. S.A.C. much checked by the state of the roads, he postponed the movement. Therefore Kossovich was directed to resist, the IV. S.A.C. and Samsonov's cavalry remaining close to the north bank of the Sha Ho in his rear. Kossovich was soon afterwards (at 9 a.m.) hard pressed by the 3rd Division in front and by the

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5th Division on his left, both divisions using all their guns, whereas Kossovich never had more than 16 pieces, though he was assisted by two batteries of the IV. S.A.C. firing from the north bank. The extreme right of the Japanese 5th Division, crossing the river above Sha Ho village, actually attacked the left of the IV. S.A.C. The peril of Kossovich was due to Zasulich's retreat, and, worse still, the latter about 9.30 a.m. continued his retreat northwards.

Meantime the centre of the 2nd Army, *i.e.* the 6th Division, had attacked the I. S.A. Corps' rear-guard under Rutkovski, capturing one Russian battery. Rutkovski and Kossovich then both fell back over the Sha Ho, and the mass of Zarubaiev's forces started for Liao-yang—a movement to be covered by Samsonov's cavalry, with which was Posokhov's detachment. This evening the Russian Southern Front stood thus: I. S.A.C. on the right of the entrenched position across the railway; to the east the II. S.A.C. covered by two rifle regiments on the south-west and by Tolmachev in the south; the IV. S.A.C. north of the I. S.A.C. and south-west of Liao-yang; Samsonov north of Sha Ho village.

The Japanese could not pursue, owing to fatigue, and at night stood thus from the west: on the extreme left and north of the Sha Ho the 1st Cavalry Brigade; 4th and 6th Divisions south of the river; 3rd Division just south of Sha Ho

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village; 5th Division also south of the river, but with its right across the river east of Sha Ho village; and still more to the east the 10th Division, with the 10th Kobi Brigade in rear.

ACTIONS ROUND LIAO-YANG ITSELF: AUGUST 29 TO SEPTEMBER 5

August 29. August 29.—The main Russian position of Liao-yang comprised two lines of defence. (1) The "advanced" position from the Tai-tzu Ho below Liao-yang through Ma-yeh-tun on the railway to Hsia-pu on the Tai-tzu Ho (15 miles long), then over the river to Sha-ho-tun. South of the Tai-tzu Ho its western sector, though having a good field of fire, had been hastily prepared; its central sector was not good for defence, as there was a good deal of dead ground; its eastern sector was better. Entrenchments and wire entanglements strengthened the position. (2) The "main" position round Liao-yang, touching the river at either end, with 16 redoubts connected by trenches and with several bridges over the river in addition to the railway bridge (length, 10 miles).

All means of defence known to armies were employed, including a light railway and a captive balloon, and in front the gaoljan had been partly cut down; but the position had three defects—there were heights in front on which the enemy could plant guns, the reserves could not be put out of

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range, the gaoljan hid the hostile infantry and checked the Russian cavalry.

Kuropatkin had 135,000 infantry (116,000 in G.O.A.), 16,000 cavalry, and 596 guns, including 36 mortars, consisting of the forces already named and the V. S.A.C. under General Dembovski, half of whose troops, under General Orlov, detrained several miles north of Liao-yang. On the opposite side the Japanese numbered 115,000 infantry, 4,500 cavalry, and 450 guns, including 40 mortars and howitzers.

At 5.40 p.m. Kuropatkin issued the following orders for occupying the first line of defence: Kossakovski in the Liao Ho valley to cover the extreme right, Liubavin and Madritov at Pen-hsi-hu and eastwards to cover the extreme left; Stakelberg's I. S.A.C. to stand at south-east of Ma-yeh-tun, having Gerngross on the right and Kondratovich on the left, with Gurko's cavalry west of the railway on the right rear; Ivanov's III. S.A.C. to stand on the last corps' left, having Danilov on the right, with 32 guns commanding the gap between the two corps, and Stolitza (Kashtalinski commanded from August 31) on the left with 32 guns; then Sluchevski's X. A.C. to swing round to the river at Hsia-pu, having Gershelmann on the right and Vasiliev on the left, with in all 64 (or 80) guns and 12 howitzers; north of the river Bilderling's XVII. A.C. to stretch towards Pen-hsi-hu. As General Reserve

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were Zarubaiev's IV. S.A.C. behind the second line of defence, north of the city itself; Zasulich's II. S.A.C. in rear of the III. S.A.C., just outside the second line of defence; and half Dembovski's V. S.A.C. (LXXI. Division), north of the river and close to the city, the other half (LIV. Division), under Orlov, being some miles to the rear; and lastly Samsonov's Cossacks just outside the second line of defence on the west. The left was covered by Bilderling; the right by Mishchenko on the right of the I. S.A.C., and by Grekov's cavalry on the right bank of the river from Liao-yang downwards.

The Japanese idea was for the 1st Army to contain the X. A.C. and to cross the river and outflank the XVII. A.C., whilst the 2nd and 4th Armies rolled back the Russians on to Liao-yang. The General Reserve was in rear of the 2nd Army, whilst some Guard Kobi troops watching Penhsi-hu would also cross and sweep round, covering the right of the 1st Army.

August 30. August 30.—In the morning the Russians took up the above positions, and on the other side the Japanese in the night, August 29 to 30, converged —on their right the 1st Army in this order from the north: the 12th Division prepared to cross to the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, the 2nd and Guard Divisions prepared to assail the X. A.C. and the III. S.A.C.; in their centre the 4th Army, which had its right (10th Division) against the

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right flank of the III. S.A.C., and its left (5th Division) against the left of the I. S.A.C.; on their left the 2nd Army, which aimed at the I. S.A.C., and which had the 3rd Division along the Mandarin road, the 6th and the 4th west of the railway; the cavalry was on the wings; the 1st F.A. Brigade was divided between the 2nd and 4th Armies, and the 2nd Army had also 36 howitzers.

At dawn massed artillery fired on the southern face of the Russian lines. The 1st Army then launched the left (Matsunaga's) brigade of the 2nd Division against the X. A.C. south of the Tai-tzu Ho; next the 2nd Brigade of the Guard and 29th Kobi Regiment against the right of the X. A.C.; and next the 1st Brigade of the Guard against the left of the III. S.A.C., this brigade being supposed to connect with the 4th Army, whose 10th Division attacked the right of the same corps.

The III. S.A.C. steadily resisted, but had to use its reserves, and had to call for help from Zasulich, who at 10 a.m. also sent a strong force under General Putilov, which in echelon on the right rear at Pa-chia-kan-tzu flanked the gap between the I. and III. S.A.C. The Japanese infantry, dashing out of the gaoljan, were shot down, and few dashed back. Such was the battle here till 12 noon, at which hour the guns redoubled their efforts; but all the assaults of the 1st Brigade of the Guard and 10th Division failed, and they had

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to retire and entrench themselves—a result largely due to the Russian artillery and to want of concert between Matsunaga (3rd Brigade, 2nd Division) and Hasegawa (Guard), the former not doing anything. The 2nd Brigade of the Guard also failed against the right of the X. A.C.

With regard to the I. S.A.C., the 2nd Army opened its guns at 6 a.m. (the heavy guns came up in railway trucks drawn by men), and covered by their fire the 5th Division and the three divisions of the 2nd Army attacked, and about 12 noon the I. S.A.C. found itself pressed in front and on the flanks, so that troops from the General Reserve had to be sent, whilst the mass of the II. S.A.C. moved on to the Mandarin road directly behind the I. S.A.C., whose commander always looked after himself. All this time the 5th, 3rd, and 6th Divisions were fruitlessly attacking, whilst the 4th Division was circling round Stakelberg's right, and in doing so was met not by Gurko, who just then was, curious to say, moved to the left rear, but by troops sent along the railway from the IV. S.A.C. All the day on the flanks the extreme left, *i.e.* the 4th Division, which displayed little vigour throughout the battle (it was held back for fear of a counter-attack), was opposed by Mishchenko, whilst the right of the 2nd Division (Okasaki's brigade) was held back to cover the crossing of the 12th Division. At 8 p.m. all fighting ceased.

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Kuropatkin exercised no real control; he used his reserve not to strike in mass, but to feed piecemeal the corps in first line. The mutual help rendered by the X. A.C. and the III. S.A.C. should be praised. During the afternoon the Russians heard that small parties of the 12th Division were crossing the Tai-tzu Ho to the east of the XVII. A.C.—a risky movement due to a report that Kuropatkin was retiring on Mukden. The fact is that Kuroki, not Oyama, believed from August 30 to September 1 that the Russians were retiring on Mukden, and therefore thought he would be safe on the northern bank.

August 31.—Kuropatkin therefore instructed his commanders that if such a movement in force took place the troops should be retired on the second line of defence, and the enemy should be attacked north of the river; this order required confirmation, and Kuropatkin did not confirm it till the evening of this day. The accounts given by the two combatants of this day seriously differ. August 31.

As to Kuroki, his 12th Division and Okasaki's brigade of the 2nd Division—Matsunaga's brigade of that division being then attached to the Guard—crossed the Tai-tzu Ho at Lien-tao-wan, and farther down, during the early part of August 31. They then entrenched opposite Bilderling's left flank. The Japanese were now astride a river, with all the risks of that position—compare the Allies before Paris, 1815, McClellan on the

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Chickahominy, 1862, and Wellington on the Nive, 1813. Why did not Bilderling and his Cossacks crush these inferior forces? Orbeliani's cavalry on his left had reported the facts to him at 9 a.m., and he was guilty of doing nothing, whilst Liubavin at Pen-hsi-hu had already been at 4 a.m. driven northwards by the Guard Kobi troops under Umezawa. Kuroki's position was, however, most critical, especially as Vasiliev, commanding the left of the X. C., wisely meditated an offensive on the apparently retiring Japanese, but Kuropatkin refused consent. As a fact the X. and XVII. Corps could have destroyed Kuroki's three brigades.

No. 2 chance.

Meantime in the centre Matsunaga's brigade and the Guard 2nd Brigade remained entrenched before the X. A.C., as also the Guard 1st Brigade, and the 10th Division before the III. S.A.C., which they in vain assailed. Moreover, on the Japanese left the 5th Division and the 2nd Army against the I. S.A.C. delivered a night attack, August 30–31, and again at 4.30 a.m., attacking the front and both flanks; the flanking movement of the Japanese 4th Division was checked by the troops sent along the railway from the IV. S.A.C. and by Mishchenko. Thus the Russians still held their first line; but, by Kuropatkin's orders, the army began to retire in the evening, a thing which damaged its moral.

On this day Orlov's force (part of LIV. Division

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of the V. S.A.C. and Grulev's detachment) was directed to march towards the XVII. A.C.

September 1.—The Russians at night, August 31 to September 1, abandoned their first line unattacked because of Japanese fatigue, and at daybreak the Russians stood thus: I. S.A.C. on the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho on the railway; III. S.A.C. just north of Liao-yang itself on the left bank; X. A.C. over the river just south of the I. S.A.C. The second line of defence was entrusted to the IV. S.A.C. on the north, the II. S.A.C. on the south, and half the V. S.A.C. (LXXI. Division), having 124 field guns and 24 mortars. Besides, a strong detachment, under Kondratovich, from the I. S.A.C. held the fort at the extreme northern end of the second line on the river. Thus, counting in Samsonov's cavalry, which joined Orlov near the Yen-tai mines, and Mishchenko, also sent towards the XVII. A.C., Kuropatkin had a great superiority in numbers on the northern bank. September 1.

On the southern bank the Japanese simply bombarded the entrenched camp of Liao-yang; on the right bank the XVII. A.C. had Yanjul's Division on the right facing the river near Height 1057, and Dobrjinski's XXXV. Division on the left near Manjuyama hill—also called Nyejínsk hill—facing east, a combined brigade under General Ekk in reserve, and Prince Orbelíani's cavalry on the left flank. Kuropatkin's best course would have been to hurry his I. S.A.C.

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and X. A.C. this night to the left of the XVII. A.C. and crush Kuroki, who could have had no help from the south bank because the river was in flood. As a fact, he delayed and finally retired.

On the other hand, Kuroki acted vigorously; in order to cut the Russian retreat to Mukden he took the offensive, calling up Umezawa towards the Yen-tai mines.

At 5 a.m. Okasaki's brigade on the left, close to the river, made for Manjuyama, whilst on the right the 12th Division also moved forward covered on its exterior flank by cavalry—both forces under heavy fire and through tall gaoljan. At 12 noon the appearance of a Russian column from the Yen-tai mines produced a halt—it was Orlov (or else Samsonov and Orbeliani, G.O.A.). In spite of this Okasaki decided to attack Manjuyama, which he did as the moon rose, and at 12 midnight he had captured the hill, repulsing a counter-attack. This capture rendered a Russian offensive very difficult. This attack by Okasaki was delivered without knowing that Orlov's appearance had changed Kuroki's view, and had indeed caused that general to send for Matsunaga's brigade.

September 2.

September 2.—The Japanese now reckoned on a second Sedan, with Kuroki barring the Russian retreat, whilst Kuropatkin planned an attack on that general with all his forces except Dembovski's LXXI. Division, Zarubaiev's IV. S.A.C., and

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Zasulich's II. S.A.C., which remained at Liao-yang on the left bank, but the Russian commander did not execute his plan with energy.

It was necessary, therefore, for the XVII. A.C. to retake Manjuyama; but Kuroki, who this day came back to his original view, owing to the rapid advance of the 2nd and 4th Armies—Dobrjinski's attack soon undeceived him—also meditated the offensive. He directed Umezawa on the Yen-tai mines, the 12th Division and Okasaki's brigade against Dobrjinski's XXXV. Division of the XVII. A.C., west of Manju-yama, whilst the Guard was to cross the river at Hsia-pu and assail Yanjul's III. Division of the XVII. A.C. Okasaki made little headway, but still Kuropatkin failed to support Bilderling with the mass of the X. A.C. or else Kuroki must have been crushed in the morning, for Matsunaga's brigade did not reach him before the afternoon. Meantime, at 8 a.m., Dobrjinski, supported by some X. A.C. troops, attacked Manjuyama, but had to recoil. At this time the 12th Division was swinging round north-westwards on to the front Manjuyama—Yen-tai mines.

No. 3 chance.

At the latter place Orlov had received an order from Bilderling, to whom he was attached, to move south and strike Kuroki's right; but a later order from Kuropatkin complicated matters, saying, "If Bilderling is attacked, go and help him; if he is not attacked, go and

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strike Kuroki's right"; so Orlov, sending to Bilderling for fresh instructions, stopped at the Yen-tai mines, with Samsonov's cavalry north of him, and Orbeliani's cavalry south of him. At 6 a.m. the artillery both of Orlov and of the advancing right wing of the 12th Division opened, but Orlov got no news from Bilderling, and, concluding that this meant he was attacked, decided to move to his help. But the pressure of the advancing 12th Division was irresistible and threw his whole movement into such disorder that at 1 p.m. he retired westwards along the branch Yen-tai railway in the utmost confusion, whilst Stakelberg's I. S.A.C. slowly arrived in this quarter at the southern bend of the Yen-tai railway. The facts are that Orlov's men were raw and useless and had to meet Japanese bayonet charges in dense gaoljan, and that he thought he was attacked by two Japanese divisions. Stakelberg should have hurried up and assisted Orlov; but Stakelberg never assisted any one. Though Kuropatkin regards Orlov's retirement as fatal, the Japanese still regarded the situation as favourable to the Russians, who they feared might sweep round to the east against the pontoons below Lien-tao-wan.

The Manjuyama position was held by all the 2nd Division against the XXXV. Division, part of the X. A.C., and Ekk's combined brigade; farther west the III. Division (Yanjul's) of the XVII.

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A.C. on the north bank faced the Guard, who could not possibly cross from the south bank; the 12th Division, on the front Manjuyama—Yen-tai mines, faced Mishchenko, I.S.A.C., and Samsonov's cavalry. The III. S.A.C. and most of the X. A.C. were in rear of the XVII. A.C.; Umezawa in the east had been effectually checked by Liubavin. Therefore Kuropatkin still had three army corps at least, or say 55,000 infantry, 5,500 cavalry, 280 field-guns, 40 horse or mountain guns, and 12 mortars, against two Japanese divisions north of the river.

On the southern bank at 8 a.m. the 2nd and 4th Armies opened fire, and at 10 a.m. their infantry advanced, but at the close of the day had made no progress. If only in the afternoon Kuropatkin had used all his strength he must have won, but on the northern bank he was bluffed by Kuroki. No. 4 chance.

After Orlov's retreat Stakelberg unsuccessfully assailed the Japanese south of the Yen-tai mines, whence Samsonov soon afterwards had to retire westwards towards Yen-tai. More to the south the 2nd Division on Manjuyama was, late in the afternoon, attacked by the Russians, whose troops came on piecemeal, without proper artillery preparation, and with units mixed; and in any case the attack could not have succeeded, because Kuropatkin at 6 p.m. suddenly transferred the control from Bilderling to

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Sluchevski. Under these conditions the attack was delivered, and at 7 p.m. the left column of the attacking Russians gained the top of Manju-yama, but at nightfall had to recoil; whilst the right column got as far as Hsi-kuan-tun; and, latest of all, the centre column, in darkness and entangled in tall gaoljan, charged forward using the bayonet, but the fire was irresistible and they retired in disorder. After 10 p.m. these ill-digested attacks were renewed and equally failed.

September 3.

No. 5 chance.

September 3.—Kuropatkin still had a chance, and indeed planned a vigorous stroke by his left, which he renounced at 4 a.m. on hearing disquieting news from Stakelberg, Zarubaiev, and Bilderling. The moral of Kuroki's men had won the victory. Kuroki indeed was anxious—his communication with Oyama cut from the morning of the 2nd to the morning of the 3rd, his Guard passive on the south bank, Umezawa still far off, his own men worn out, and in front a superior enemy, and yet at that hour Kuropatkin ordered retreat.

Zarubaiev, Zasulich, and Dembovski's LXXI. Division of V. S.A.C. were to evacuate Liao-yang and retire along the railway, the detachment under Kondratovich hurrying first to Yen-tai station; this retreat was to be covered on the east against Kuroki by all the rest of the troops—the I. S.A.C. on the branch railway midway between Yen-tai and the mines, the III. S.A.C. south of

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that corps, the XVII. A.C. and Ekk's combined brigade to retire north-westwards towards the railway, the X. A.C. to act as a reserve in rear of the III. S.A.C., Mishchenko to connect the last corps with the XVII. A.C.

Kuroki in the morning opened fire, and at 3 p.m. called up the Guard to himself from Hsia-pu *viâ* An-ping and the pontoons at Chiang-kuan-tun below Lien-tao-wan. Meantime the 2nd and 4th Armies in the morning cannonaded the Liao-yang defences, and infantry assaults followed; but not till 8 p.m. did they penetrate, and it was 12 midnight before they were masters of the evacuated lines.

North of the river at nightfall the XVII. A.C. and Ekk's combined brigade retired (in silence, as did all the rest of the army) according to directions; as also the I. S.A.C. and the III. S.A.C. and the X. A.C. and Mishchenko. The detachments of Orlov—now under Stolitza—and Kondratovich reached Yen-tai station. To cover the right was Grekov's retiring cavalry, and to cover the left flank there were west of the Yen-tai mines the detachment Zapolski (from the I. S.A.C.), Gurko's cavalry from the same corps, and Samsonov's cavalry. To the east Umezawa, having driven Liubavin northwards on Mukden, was approaching the Yen-tai mines. Kuropatkin did not yet realise the Japanese idea, though it should have been clear that they wanted to cut his

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retreat on Mukden, but were too weak north of the Tai-tzu Ho to do so.

September 4. September 4.—At 1 a.m. the Russians, breaking all bridges, had completely evacuated Liao-yang, the II. and IV. S.A.C. and Dembovski retiring along the railway. This morning the 2nd Brigade of the Guard joined the 1st Army *viâ* Chiang-kuan-tun, and the Guard Cavalry crossing a good way below took up position on the left of the 2nd Division, but the 1st Brigade still south of the river moved to the point where the cavalry had crossed.

About 6 p.m., to cover the movement on Mukden, the detachment Kondratovich reinforced the detachment Zapolski, Gurko, and Samsonov, and against them came Umezawa; the last-named was repulsed. Kuroki's 2nd and 12th Divisions were unduly slow in pursuit, perhaps owing to the gaoljan or to fog or to fatigue—the former division hardly moving at all, and the latter division not attacking the I. S.A.C. till 1 a.m. on September 5 in a bloody bayonet struggle. The only Russian forces that retired this day (September 4) were those from Liao-yang itself, and the X. and XVII. A.C., and they got on the railway south of Yen-tai station.

September 5. September 5.—The retreat covered by Mishchenko began in earnest, and there was no pursuit; for the Japanese infantry were worn out, and they had not enough cavalry, and rain fell in torrents.

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The losses from August 24 to September 5 were 18,000 Russians and 23,000 Japanese.

Comments.—The results of this great battle—the crisis of the war—were that the fate of Port Arthur was sealed, that the Russians were deprived of the supplies in the Liao Ho valley, and that their connection with China was weakened. They should indeed have now offered terms of peace.

It has been remarked that in our day the size of armies, entrenchments, flank attacks, and the increased power of the defence lead to lengthy battles, but it must not be supposed that ordinary battles will last as long as Liao-yang. That battle indeed comprised several battles, just as we might call all the fighting round Metz, August 14 to 18, 1870, one Battle of Metz. But there were special reasons for the length of these Manchurian contests; *e.g.* no change in the general situation was probable; the Japanese had not numbers enough; manœuvring was restricted by the mountains and the Chinese frontier; and the Russian purely defensive attitude. In ordinary cases, however, the pace will be forced—at least, such is the opinion expressed in Hamley's "Operations of War."

Each adversary lost a great chance. If on August 30 Oyama had thrown all Kuroki's army over the river, it could have seized the Mukden road. In all the other battles the Japanese obeyed Clausewitz, but at Liao-yang they dis-

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obeyed him, when they made Kuroki too weak. The frontal attack was an error; the troops making it should have been depleted to reinforce Kuroki. Oyama indeed hovered between turning the right and turning the left of the enemy; he then tried to do both without sufficient numbers. If he had elected to turn the right flank he should have pushed all his forces more westwards and not at first held the 12th Division and half the 2nd Division inactive. Again, on September 1 he should have left the 2nd Army to deal with Liao-yang, and sent the 4th Army to force the river in the face of Yanjul on Height 1057; he could then have sent all the Guard over to assist Kuroki. The fact is that the Japanese numbers were insufficient to gain a final triumph. On the other hand, Kuropatkin had before him an enemy astride a river, and he could have contained one portion and crushed the other. It would have been more decisive and also more risky to attempt to crush the 2nd and 4th Armies, and the Russian tried the less risky course. In either case he should have fought *coûte que coûte*. In truth he did not reckon on Kuroki's move, or appreciate that general's weakness, or grasp the Japanese plan; if he had, he would have seen that he, like Benedek at Königgrätz, 1866, had to deal with a converging enemy. The converging armies have a great tactical advantage because they can develop more rifle-fire than can the interior-line

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army, and the best course for this latter army is to hold back part of the converging enemy and mass against the other part as suggested above.

The Russian commander was undecided, and, as Skobelef had said, unfit for supreme command; he was subdued by Oyama's will-power and by Japanese moral. He had no confidence in his commanders, and his failure to control the battle rendered them all uncertain what to do, and in consequence each as a rule looked after himself. Kuropatkin's orders often confused his commanders, and he also interfered with their troops. His retreat indeed, as usual, showed skill, but in the battle he made little use of his numerous cavalry, and, worse still, wasted his General Reserve; he also assigned too large forces for the protection of flanks and rear—he forgot Napoleon's maxim, "Nothing protects the communications more than winning the battle." Bird suggests Kuropatkin would have done better to await attack behind the Tai-tzu.

Oyama lost control, failed to use his cavalry, used his reserves prematurely, and sent Kuroki on a dangerous mission with inadequate strength; but he was saved by his generals, by the deception practised to conceal his numbers, and by the *service de sûreté, e.g.* a veil of mixed detachments before the armies. Kuroki, no doubt, used his Guard wrongly, but his will-power pulled him out and decided the result.

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CHAPTER V

SITUATION AFTER THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG

ON September 5 the 1st Brigade of the Japanese Guard crossed the Tai-tzu Ho, and joined the rest of its division, whilst all the 2nd and 4th Armies remained at Liao-yang on the left bank. At this time the 3rd Kobi Brigade and the 9th Cavalry Regiment arrived, and Oyama, perceiving that Kuropatkin had escaped, decided to reorganise, keeping all his troops south of the Tai-tzu Ho, except the 1st Army and Umezawa.

All this time Kuropatkin was pushing his retreat on Mukden, an important city, where a halt restored the moral of his men, and by September 10 the Russians stood thus:

On the left or southern bank of the Hun Ho, X. A.C. (Sluchevski), south of Mukden, II. S.A.C. (Zasulich), at Shih-fu-chang, covered from west to east by Grekov's cavalry, Mishchenko's cavalry, Liubavin's mixed detachment, Samsonov's cavalry, and Peterev's or Petrov's mixed detachment, including Madritov.

On the right or northern bank of the Hun Ho,

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V. S.A.C. (Dembovski), XVII. A.C. (Bilderling), three-quarters of the IV. S.A.C. (Zarubaiev), one brigade being in rear at Tieh-ling, I. S.A.C. (Stakelberg), the newly arrived I. A.C. (Meiendorf)—all near Mukden; III. S.A.C. (Ivanov) on the left at Fu-shun, covered on the west by Kossakovski's mixed detachment at Ta-wan on the Liao Ho, and on the east by Ekk's mixed detachment at Ying-pan on the Hun Ho; for Kuropatkin was always anxious for his flanks, especially the left. He had too many men on the flanks; cavalry could have done the work.

To prepare for the future the Japanese filled up gaps by calling out more troops, bridged the Tai-tzu Ho, and got supplies by water from Ying-kou until the river became frozen; by the end of September, however, the railway had been adapted to Japanese rolling-stock, which helped the supply of the 2nd Army, based on Ying-kou, and of the 4th Army, based on Ta-lien-wan, though the 1st Army was still supplied by the tramway from An-tung to Feng-huang-cheng, and thence by carts. The want of a good map was much felt; but still by September 17 Oyama—125,000 strong, according to Major Bird—occupied the following positions, all north of the Tai-tzu Ho: Across the railway north of Liao-yang, in order from west to east, 2nd Army, 4th Army, 1st Army, covered in front by mixed detachments, and on the left in the Hun Ho

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valley by Akiyama's 1st Cavalry Brigade, and on the right by the Umezawa Guard mixed brigade; reserve at Liao-yang itself.

This day, September 17, General Rennenkampf, who had superseded General Liubavin, heavily attacked Umezawa. Further signs of hostile movements on the east appeared, *i.e.* still against Umezawa, and therefore reinforcements were despatched to that officer, and on the arrival of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, under Prince Kanin, it was assigned to Kuroki, and placed on the right of the 1st Army.

Meantime Kuropatkin was preparing for the offensive, for Port Arthur was in peril, and must be saved so as to allow its fleet to join the Baltic fleet, winter was coming, his men wanted a victory, and he had superior numbers; but unfortunately he did not act quickly enough. He took measures to strengthen his fighting power —*e.g.* the VI. S.A.C. was approaching from the north, three mountain batteries arrived, and men were discharged from the hospitals. At the end of September he was stronger than before by 50,000 men, and the "Mukden Position" was strongly entrenched on both banks; there were three fortified lines to the south of the Hun Ho covering the bridges, and to the north of the river entrenchments stretched east and west of Mukden, all trenches having overhead cover. This position was useless because the Japanese

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could ford the Hun Ho anywhere. Many roads were constructed, including a military road from Harbin to Mukden, but rain would soon render them impassable, and even the Mandarin road was unmetalled. On September 29 Kuropatkin reported to the Viceroy, Alexeiev, that he had twelve bridges—G.O.A. says fifteen—over the Hun Ho, and four bridges over the Liao Ho at Tieh-ling, that the ammunition supplies, the transport, and the men's health were in a satisfactory condition.

Great difficulty was caused by ignorance of the topography—compare Jackson's experience just before the Seven Days' Battles, 1862, and Benedek's ignorance of the Braunau Pass, 1866—but numerous reconnaissances were carried out eastwards, where collisions constantly occurred during this month of September. On the 28th Kuropatkin issued secret orders for the advance of his Manchurian Army—it was to attack the enemy with the object of seizing the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. The orders also distributed the troops afresh in two wings and a reserve—the western wing to contain, and the eastern wing to attack.

(*a*) WESTERN FORCE, UNDER GENERAL BILDERLING

X. A.C. under Sluchevski, XVII. A.C. under Volkov, plus Grekov's Cossacks. Major Bird, including Dembovski but not VI. S.A.C., gives

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the numbers as 50,000 infantry, 7,500 cavalry, and 222 guns. It was to advance along both sides of the railway, and on the second day of the advance to entrench the front Lin-sheng-pu—Sha-ho-pu, and to draw upon itself the main force of the Japanese.

(*b*) EASTERN FORCE, UNDER GENERAL STAKELBERG

I. S.A.C. under Gerngross, II. S.A.C. under Zasulich, III. S.A.C. under Ivanov, plus Samsonov's Cossacks. Bird gives the numbers as 60,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 200 guns, including machine-guns, quick-firing guns, mountain-guns, and mortars. It was to move on the second day of the advance into the front Pa-chia-tzu—Fei-tsun-pu—Tai-chia-miao-tzu. Objective was to seize Japanese positions at Pien-niu-lu-pu (Bian-yu-pu-sa)—in fact to crush the 1st Army.

(*c*) GENERAL RESERVE

IV. S.A.C. under Zarubaiev, who was to cross the Hun Ho at Huang-ni-kan, south-south-east of Mukden, ready to assist either Bilderling or Stakelberg;

I. A.C. under Meiendorf, who was to cross the Hun Ho by the Mandarin road at Chiao-ho;

Mishchenko's Cossacks, who were to make for Liu-fan-tun on the Sha Ho, so as to fill up the gap between the Western and Eastern Forces;

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VI. S.A.C. under Sobolev, north of Mukden, who was to protect the rear.

Bird reckons all these forces as 55,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 304 guns.

(*d*) FLANK DETACHMENTS

On the right of the Western Force Dembovski was to move down the west bank of the Hun Ho, seize the Chang-tan crossing, and guard the Russian communications. On the extreme right in the Liao valley there was a mixed force under Kossakovski—5,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and 16 guns. On the left of the Eastern Force there was a mixed body under Rennenkampf, including the detachments Ekk, Liubavin, and Peterev or Petrov. On the extreme left was Madritov's small detachment—1,000 infantry, 400 cavalry, and 2 guns.

The B.O.A. reckons the grand total as 275,000 rank and file, with 792 guns; the G.O.A. states 210,000; and Bird states 171,000 infantry, 17,000 cavalry, and 744 guns. In the above order no date for the advance was as yet fixed.

The Russian cavalry brought in little intelligence, and Kuropatkin was convinced that Nodzu had the 8th Division—not yet arrived—calculated his enemies as 144,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 648 guns, and judged that two divisions were west of the railway between Ho-kung-pu and Shen-tan-pu, four divisions east of the railway

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in the area Liao-yang—Sha-ho-tun—Chang-tai-tzu, and two divisions on the line Pien-niu-lu-pu—Pen-hsi-hu. The G.O.A. reckons their numbers as 170,000. Bird assigns to Kuroki 40,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry, and 120 guns; to Nodzu 20,000 infantry, 400 cavalry, and 72 guns; to Oku 30,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry, and 114 guns; to the Reserve 25,000 infantry and 228 guns; total 115,000 infantry, 5,400 cavalry, and 534 guns.

Kuropatkin then fixed on October 5 as the day for the advance, and no doubt rumours of this reached Marshal Marquis Oyama. On October 4 the Russian commander issued his final orders, which contained nothing new, except as to Dembovski. It had just been reported that all Oku was west of the railway, and so Dembovski was not to go so far down the Hun Ho as Chang-tan, but to make for Ta-wang-kuan-pu and thence join Bilderling.

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

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CHAPTER VI

BATTLE OF THE SHA HO

ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE OF THE SHA HO, October 4–17, 1904

THE Japanese stood across the railway north of the Tai-tzu in this order from west to east: 2nd Army, 4th Army, 1st Army, covered in front by mixed detachments, and on the left in the Hun Ho valley by Akiyama's cavalry, and on the right by Umezawa at Pien-niu-lu-pu; total, 170,000, with 534 guns.

On September 28 Kuropatkin ordered an advance for October 5 with the object of seizing the right bank of the Tai-tzu, and rearranged his troops:

A Western Force under Bilderling, X. A.C. and XVII. A.C., its duty to contain Japanese left and centre; an Eastern Force under Stakelberg, I. S.A.C., II. S.A.C., III. S.A.C., its duty to crush the Japanese right; a General Reserve, IV. S.A.C. and I. A.C., and Mishchenko and VI. S.A.C.; flank detachments—on the right Dembovski, on the left Rennenkampf; total, 275,000 with 792 guns.

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The battlefield lay between the Hun Ho and the Tai-tzu, and was traversed by the railway and the Mandarin road, to the west of which lay a plain and to the east a difficult mountainous region.

FIRST PHASE, October 4–9

October 4–6.—The Russians advanced, Dembovski reaching Ta-wang-kuan-pu, XVII. A.C. Lin-sheng-pu, X. A.C. Sha-ho-pu; III. S.A.C. reaching Pa-chia-tzu, II. S.A.C. Fei-tsun-pu, I. S.A.C. Tai-chia-miao-tzu; Rennenkampf, San-chia-tzu, on the Tai-tzu.

October 7.—Bilderling and Stakelberg delayed in order to entrench, whilst Kuropatkin formed a centre out of the IV. S.A.C, the I. A.C., and Mishchenko as a link between his Eastern and Western Forces, and sent VI. S.A.C. towards Bilderling's right. This night Umezawa slipped away from Pien-niu-lu-pu to Pen-hsi-hu, towards which place Kuroki also directed his 12th Division. The 2nd and 4th Armies also began to concentrate.

October 8.—This day also Kuropatkin wasted. Bilderling went on entrenching (1) Lin-sheng-pu—Sha-ho-pu; (2) Chien-liu-tang-kou—Hung-pao-shan—Mang-chia-fen (now the main position); (3) Yen-tao-niu-lu—Shih-li-ho. Stakelberg also only occupied Pien-niu-lu-pu, and swung round so as to face Umezawa and the 12th Division.

October 9.—Stakelberg and Rennenkampf de-

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livered a serious attack on Umezawa and the 12th Division, who repulsed them. Bilderling's X. A.C. only entrenched some advanced troops at Ku-shu-tzu—Chou-kuan-tun, and moved its mass to Hung-pao-shan, and his XVII. A.C. only moved its mass to Chien-liu-tang-kou. Dembovski remained stationary at Ta-wang-kuan-pu. This day Oyama resigned his first notion of a defensive-offensive battle and decided on offensive action.

SECOND PHASE, October 10–17

October 10.—Stakelberg did nothing, but Kuropatkin did close up his centre, *i.e.* IV. S.A.C., Mishchenko, Mau's brigade of X. A.C. on Temple Hill, and I. A.C., opposite to the Guard and 2nd Division; the 4th Army had its 5th Division checked by the able resistance of Colonel Solomka, commanding advanced troops of the X. A.C. on the Wu-li-tai-tzu Hill; west of the railway the 2nd Army pushed back the XVII. A.C. into its advanced position Yen-tao-niu-lu — Shih-li-ho. Oyama now wished to wheel his armies so as to force the Russians north-eastwards away from Mukden.

October 11.—Solomka retired on to the X. A.C. troops at Ying-pan, and the Japanese 5th Division secured Wu-li-tai-tzu Hill; Stakelberg again unsuccessfully assailed Umezawa and the 12th Division, and the impending retreat of the Russian centre rendered him uneasy for his right. The

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Guard attacked Mishchenko and the left of the IV. S.A.C. round Watanabe Yama, the 2nd Division acting against the right of the IV. S.A.C., and General Mau found that its 3rd Brigade (Matsunaga) could make little impression on Sancheng-tzu Shan, but its 15th Brigade (Okasaki) wrested Temple Hill from General Mau, who fell back on the I. A.C. The 4th Army swung its 10th Division (its right) north-eastwards so as to face Mau and the I. A.C. north of Temple Hill, whilst its 5th Division (its left) stood fronting the X. A.C. at Ying-pan and the left of the XVII. A.C. at Shih-li-ho. As Dembovski and the VI. S.A.C. did nothing the 2nd Army had to deal only with the XVII. A.C., from which it wrested Yen-tao-niu-lu.

Night Operations, October 11–12

Oyama reinforced the 10th Division with some Kobi troops, but withdrew the 5th Division, except the Yamada detachment, on Wu-li-tai-tzu Hill, so as to form a General Reserve. Three events occurred: (1) the XVII. A.C. retook Yen-tao-niu-lu; (2) the 10th Division carried San-kuai-shih Shan against Mau and the I. A.C.; (3) the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division, acting against the right of the IV. S.A.C., carried Sancheng-tzu Shan.

October 12.—The 2nd Army captured Yen-tao-niu-lu and Shih-li-ho, and drove the XVII. A.C.

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in rout northwards. This corps abandoned the main position of Chien-liu-tang-kou, and fell back into the original position at Lin-sheng-pu, having on its right flank the VI. S.A.C. and Dembovski. Oku merely occupied Chien-liu-tang-kou.

Opposite the Yamada detachment the X. A.C. abandoned the Ying-pan and Hung-pao-shan positions, and fell back into the original position at Sha-ho-pu followed by Yamada.

The 10th Division, *i.e.* the 4th Army, and 15th Brigade of 2nd Division, could not carry Lo-ta Shan against Mau and the I. A.C., but the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division drove back the right of the IV. S.A.C., and the Guard also drove back the left of the IV. S.A.C. and Mishchenko. Kuroki then in error directed Matsunaga's 3rd Brigade to proceed to the help of Umezawa.

Stakelberg's vigorous attack on Umezawa and the 12th Division failed, and he began his retreat. In fact, the Russian centre was holding a dangerous exposed salient, but the Japanese Guard was also exposed to a blow on the right from Stakelberg's reserve, the II. S.A.C.

October 13.—Kuropatkin abandoned the offensive. To cover his retreat Stakelberg delivered an able counter-attack on the exposed right of the Guard, then engaged with the left of the IV. S.A.C. and Mishchenko; this attack, if pressed, might have had serious results. As a

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fact, it so alarmed Oyama that he sent his General Reserve, the 5th Division, in that direction.

Okasaki's 15th Brigade carried the Lo-ta Shan against Mau and the right wing of the IV. S.A.C.; Mau and the IV. S.A.C. and Mishchenko then retired on Feng-chi-pu.

Meantime round Mang-chia-fen the 4th Army opposed the I. A.C., which slowly withdrew to the left of the X. A.Corps' position at Sha-ho-pu.

The 2nd Army with the 3rd Division (which took the place of Yamada, withdrawn by Oyama) faced the X. A.C. at Sha-ho-pu, transferred its 6th Division to its right, and faced the XVII. A.C. at Lin-sheng-pu, the VI. S.A.C. and Dembovski, with Koizumi's detachment of the 6th Division, the 4th Division, and Akiyama. Note the Japanese were shifting eastwards.

October 14.—Kuroki sent his right wing, *i.e.* 5th Division, Matsunaga, 12th Division, and Umezawa, after Stakelberg as far as the south bank of the Sha Ho, and the rest of his 1st Army, *i.e.* Guard and 15th Brigade, on Feng-chi-pu after the Russian centre, *i.e.* Mau, IV. S.A.C., and Mishchenko.

The retreat of the IV. S.A.C. and Mau left the I. A.C. in peril, and against it Oyama launched the 4th Army (10th Division, and most of 6th Division), with the result that the I. A.C. fled across the Sha Ho.

Meantime in the 2nd Army the 3rd Division

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carried the southern part of Sha-ho-pu against the X. A.C., and, with the help of the 6th Division, repulsed a counter-attack on its right delivered by Kuropatkin with some parts of the I. A.C., Koizumi's detachment carried Lin-sheng-pu against the XVII. A.C., and the 4th Division and Akiyama repelled a dangerous attack of the VI. S.A.C. and Dembovski.

October 15.—Kuropatkin created fresh defences south of Pao-chia-a-tzu, and collected there a new reserve of 20,000 men from various corps; but the Yamada detachment, again sent forward, carried Putilov Hill against the I. A.C. troops, and in the 2nd Army the united 6th Division, *i.e.* including Koizumi, now restored to its old position, carried La-mu-tun against the XVII. A.C.

October 16.—Yamada carried One Tree Hill, but this hill and Putilov Hill were retaken by the new Russian reserve, which put into extreme peril the 3rd Division in the south part of Sha-ho-pu opposite to the X. A.C. The VI. S.A.C. and Dembovski made a futile attack on the 4th Division and Akiyama.

October 17.—The battle closed.

THE BATTLE OF THE SHA HO, October 4–17

The Battlefield.—Bounded on the west and north by the Hun Ho, on the south by the Tai-tzu Ho, and on the east by the head-waters of

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the Shih-li Ho and Sha Ho (on these last two fordable rivers most of the fighting occurred), it was traversed by the railway and the Mandarin road, to the west of which lay a level country studded with villages affording good means of defence; for the purpose of attacking these villages good cover was offered by the numerous graveyards. Artillery, however, could find no good positions. The millet harvest being nearly over, the sharp stalks left in the ground hampered cavalry; but where the millet was uncut or else stacked in the fields troops could move unseen by friend or foe, as occurred during the first three days to the 2nd Army. The streams running from east to west presented considerable difficulties (G.O.A. differs). To the east of the Mandarin road the country becomes mountainous, and round Pien-niu-lu-pu extremely difficult, restricting troops to the mountain tracks.

FIRST PHASE, October 4–9

October 4. October 4.—The Russians advanced, and Oyama became suspicious, but as yet did nothing.

October 6. October 6.—By the evening on the Russian right Dembovski had reached Ta-wang-kuan-pu, east of the Hun Ho, and Bilderling's Western Force had reached positions assigned by the above orders, *i.e.* the XVII. A.C. on the right held Lin-sheng-pu with advanced troops as far as the Shih-li Ho, including a mixed detachment under

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Colonel Stakhovich, whilst Grekov's Cossacks on the right rear of the XVII. A.C. connected with Dembovski; and the X. A.C. on the left held Sha-ho-pu, with advanced troops ahead.

At the same time on the Russian left Stakelberg's Eastern Force had carried out its programme, *i.e.* on the left III. S.A.C. at Pa-chia-tzu, in the centre II. S.A.C. at Fei-tsun-pu, on the right I. S.A.C. at Tai-chia-miao-tzu, with advanced troops in front, and far in advance on the left Samsonov's Cossacks connecting with Rennenkampf at San-chia-tzu on the Tai-tzu Ho.

All this day reports kept convincing Kuroki that Umezawa's Guard mixed brigade at Pien-niu-lu-pu was in peril (ignorance of topography had caused him to be placed in such an exposed position), and so he directed that officer to retire on Pen-hsi-hu on the Tai-tzu Ho. As yet Kuropatkin had succeeded, and had put the 1st Army into considerable danger, and yet at that moment he delayed in order to construct a defensive position, directing the Western Force to entrench all day on October 7; on this day a slight affair occurred between the advanced troops of the X. A.C. and those of the 4th Army. As to the Eastern Force it also hardly stirred, and the only real movements this day were by the Reserve—the IV. S.A.C. moved to Ehr-tao-kou, the I. A.C. to Liu-fan-tun, as links together with Mishchenko between the Western and Eastern Forces, whilst

October 7.

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the VI. S.A.C. was ordered to cross to the south bank of the Hun Ho on to Bilderling's right rear.

Thus were twenty-four hours wasted, and that night Umezawa slipped away from Pien-niu-lu-pu,

October 8. and on October 8 reached the neighbourhood of Pen-hsi-hu; moreover, further to protect his right, Kuroki despatched his 12th Division to Cheng-kou Ling on Umezawa's left, and concentrated his Guard on the left of the 12th Division.

Meantime the 2nd and 4th Armies were also concentrating, for information had caused Oyama

October 7. to issue orders on October 7 for concentration of his three armies with a view to defensive-offensive action. In consequence the 2nd Army on the left placed its 4th and 3rd Divisions on the front Chang-chia-wo-peng—Hsiao-pa-tai-tzu, with the 6th Division in rear, and mixed detachments in front; and the 4th Army in the centre—5th and 10th Divisions—with mixed detachments in front stretched through Lan-ni-pu connecting with the 1st Army, which—2nd Division, Guard, 12th Division, Umezawa's men—bent round through Cheng-kou Ling towards Pen-hsi-hu. On the southern bank of the Tai-tzu at Liao-yang stood the General Reserve under Uchiyama.

October 8. This day also Kuropatkin wasted: though the VI. S.A.C. had arrived on Bilderling's right rear, yet the XVII. A.C. and the X. A.C. were to go on fortifying—note this recurrence of the posi-

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tionist heresy of the eighteenth century—(1) the original position Lin-sheng-pu—Sha-ho-pu; (2) the position held by the advanced guards, Chien-liu-tang-kou — Hung-pao-shan — Mang-chia-fen, which was now to become the main position; (3) and for the XVII. A.C. a third position, Yen-tao-niu-lu—Shih-li-ho. Thus in four days, though the Russian right was well closed up, it had covered only twenty miles from the Hun Ho.

As to the Russian Eastern Force it also did little; it did, however, occupy Umezawa's abandoned trenches near Pien-niu-lu-pu, but Stakelberg did not inform Kuropatkin of this, an omission which cost the Russians dear. The movements on this wing during this day, the 8th, may be described as swinging round on the pivot of Pien-niu-lu-pu, where was the I. S.A.C., entrenched, having the II. S.A.C. entrenched on its left, whilst the III. S.A.C. was swinging round on Li-chia-wo-peng, Rennenkampf standing south of this place on the Tai-tzu Ho, and Samsonov pushing to Hsiang-shan-tzu. Thus Samsonov, the III. S.A.C., and Rennenkampf were in presence of Umezawa. Rennenkampf had in his march from San-chia-tzu down the Tai-tzu been resisted by Umezawa at Wei-ning-ying, which he carried by Ekk and Petrov attacking in front on the northern bank, and by Liubavin's Cossacks attacking from the southern bank.

This evening, the 8th, Kuropatkin was still

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ignorant of the capture of Pien-niu-lu-pu, and at
October 9. 9 a.m. on October 9 directed Stakelberg to confine his efforts to taking that village, and suggested the 10th as the day for the great effort—he was evidently over-cautious. Likewise he instructed Bilderling to press forward slowly only a short distance; how this weak action could influence Oyama is difficult to see.

Stakelberg, nevertheless, decided to act with the I. S.A.C. and III. S.A.C. against the 12th Division, and Umezawa on the front Cheng-kou Ling—Tu-men-tzu Ling—Ta Ling; Rennenkampf and Samsonov to assist, and the II. S.A.C. to stand in reserve.

Kuroki, protected though he was by abattis and wire entanglements, etc., was in peril; Liubavin's Cossacks, south of the Tai-tzu, endangered his communications *vid* Chiao-tou. He therefore directed the 2nd Cavalry Brigade to move off to Chiao-tou, and the 12th Division to send part of its troops to help Umezawa. As a fact, Rennenkampf confined his attentions to Pen-hsi-hu, where he assailed the small defending force of Japanese with Liubavin's Cossacks, taking them in reverse from the south bank, and with Petrov's and Ekk's infantry, plus troops from the III. S.A.C., taking them in front on the north bank. The Japanese sternly resisted all day, but lost their advanced positions, and would have had to evacuate Pen-hsi-hu but for the arrival of the

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greater part of the 12th Division, whose commander, General Inouye, now superseded Umezawa.

Meantime at Tu-men-tzu Ling and Ta Ling General Umezawa's small numbers were pressed by part of the III. S.A.C. from Li-chia-wo-peng, and by General Samsonov and part of the I. S.A.C. from Hsiang-shan-tzu. The mass of this last army corps, commanded by General Gerngross, and hampered by want of good maps, was endeavouring to find its way so as to fall upon the Cheng-kou Ling, still held by part of the 12th Division, and it did succeed in connecting on its right with the Russian centre, *i.e.* IV. S.A.C. and Mishchenko, and together these forces repulsed advanced troops of the Guard and 2nd Division, and reached the front Hsia-liu-ho-tzu—Pa-chia-tzu. The II. S.A.C., Stakelberg's reserve, entrenched at Pien-niu-lu-pu.

As to the Western Force all the X. A.C. did was to entrench some advanced troops at Ku-shu-tzu and Chou-kuan-tun after repelling some advanced troops of the 10th Division, and to move its mass as far as Hung-pao-shan. Similarly all the XVII. A.C. did was to move its mass to the entrenched position at Chien-liu-tang-kou, and with its advanced troops to repel some advanced troops of the 5th Division from Shuang-tai-tzu, thus coming into line with the X. A.C. troops at Chou-kuan-tun; Bilderling's right was covered

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by Grekov's cavalry and Stakhovich's detachment at Ta-tung-shan-pu on the Sha Ho, driving thence some advanced troops of the 3rd Division. Still farther westwards Dembovski's detachment remained at Ta-wang-kuan-pu on the Hun Ho.

The General Reserve—VI. S.A.C.—was entrenched at Lan-shan-pu on Bilderling's right rear, and the I. A.C. at Liu-fan-tun in rear of the new centre.

The forces being now in close contact, Marshal Marquis Oyama, resigning his first notion of a defensive-offensive battle, decided on offensive action, and issued orders this night, the 9th; these orders directed a northward offensive movement by the Umezawa force through Hsiang-shan-tzu *versus* Samsonov, Stäkelberg, and Rennenkampf; a movement by the mass of the 1st Army northwards on Feng-chi-pu on the Sha Ho *versus* Mishchenko, IV. S.A.C., and part of the I. S.A.C.; a movement by the 4th Army northwards on Hung-pao-shan *versus* X. A.C.; a movement by the 2nd Army on both sides of the Sha Ho *versus* XVII. A.C., Grekov, and Stakhovich; Akiyama's 1st Cavalry Brigade to watch Chang-tan on the Hun Ho. As a General Reserve Oyama retained two Kobi brigades at Lo-ta-tai behind the 4th Army.

SECOND PHASE, October 10–17

October 10. October 10.—Oyama refused to fight a defensive battle, and planned to allow the 12th Division

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and Umezawa's force to oppose the far superior Russian Eastern Force, whilst the rest of the 1st Army and all the 4th and 2nd Armies would oppose the slightly inferior Russian Western Force and centre; he also retained a far smaller reserve than did Kuropatkin—two Kobi brigades as against the VI. S.A.C., I. A.C., and Dembovski's detachment.

So difficult was the country and so bad were the maps that Stakelberg meant to give up this day to reconnaissance, but he had an order from Kuropatkin to push westwards past Pen-hsi-hu in the direction of the Yen-tai coal-mines. His reply was to the effect that his ignorance of the topography of the district and the non-capture of Pen-hsi-hu rendered such a course impossible. Kuropatkin's answer was that Stakelberg should act as ordered as soon as possible. Whilst waiting for this answer Stakelberg instructed that next day, the 11th, the I. S.A.C. was to assail the 12th Division and Umezawa at Cheng-kou Ling and Tu-men-tzu Ling; the III. S.A.C. plus Samsonov and Rennenkampf were to move against Pen-hsi-hu; the II. S.A.C. was to move southwards from Pien-niu-lu-pu. This inaction of Stakelberg had two results: (1) Chiao-tou was left in Japanese hands; (2) the weak right of Umezawa managed to hold its own on the hills east of Pen-hsi-hu against forces which Stakelberg might have made more numerous.

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As the 4th Army was delayed the rest of the 1st Army—Guard and 2nd Division—did nothing, but opposite to this 1st Army Kuropatkin closed up the IV. S.A.C. and Mishchenko on Hsia-liu-ho-tzu—Pa-chia-tzu, supported on the right by General Mau's X. C. brigade (under Zarubaiev) on the Temple Hill, and backed in the rear by the I. A.C. from Liu-fan-tun.

As to the 4th Army it moved early in the day against the X. A.C.; the 10th Division pushed as far as a point south-east of Chou-kuan-tun, but could get no farther because of the able resistance opposed to the 5th Division by Colonel Solomka, commanding advanced troops of the X. A.C., on a height often called the Wu-li-tai-tzu Hill, west of Ku-shu-tzu. The resistance of these three battalions of the Voronej Regiment and one battery threatened to paralyse Oyama's plan.

The Japanese 5th Division moving east of the railway did not display its usual vigour, and was held back by Solomka's skill, and it was not till 5.30 a.m. next day, the 11th, that they secured the height, Solomka retiring behind the Shih-li Ho, and joining the rest of the X. A.C. troops to the left of the XVII. A.Corps' Yen-tao-niu-lu—Shih-li-ho position, which was now entrenched as far eastwards as Ying-pan. Solomka had done well.

To the west of the railway moved the 2nd Army in this order from the right—3rd Division, 6th

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Division east of the Sha Ho, 4th Division and Akiyama's cavalry west of the Sha Ho, pushing back the XVII. A.C. troops, and those of Grekov and Stakhovich; but as the 5th Division was checked by Solomka, Oku halted his army on the front Chang-tan—Shuang-tai-tzu in line with the 5th Division.

The Russian XVII. A.C. opposite Oku had retired easily upon their advanced position, Yen-tao-niu-lu—Shih-li-ho, with Stakhovich, Grekov, and Dembovski stretching on the right to the Hun Ho.

Though the 2nd and 4th Armies had not progressed as far as he desired, Oyama issued orders for the 11th, having for their general object the driving of the enemy north-eastwards, *i.e.* the mass of the 1st Army (Guard and 2nd Division) on Feng-chi-pu against IV. S.A.C., Mishchenko, and Mau; 4th Army through Shih-li-ho on Liu-fan-tun against X. A.C. and I. A.C.; 2nd Army on Lin-sheng-pu against XVII. A.C., Grekov, and Stakhovich so as to help the wheeling movement of the 4th Army. Thus the 12th Division and Umezawa must resist a superior enemy, and the whole point was whether the 4th Army could by a frontal attack break down the X. A.C. On a front of forty miles from Chang-tan through Shih-li-ho to Pen-hsi-hu four hundred thousand men stood in battle array.

October 11.—Kuropatkin still planned to hold October 11.

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the Shih-li Ho with X. A.C. and XVII. A.C., whilst Stakelberg acted against Umezawa and the 12th Division, helped by a forward movement of the Russian Centre—IV. S.A.C., Mishchenko, and Mau's X. Corps troops.

Umezawa and the 12th Division still held the formidable heights from Cheng-kou Ling through Tu-men-tzu Ling and Ta Ling to Pen-hsi-hu. On the Russian side Samsonov, crossing the Tai-tzu Ho, joined Liubavin on the south bank, whence he shelled Pen-hsi-hu. On the northern bank Stakelberg had two columns—the left, Rennenkampf, and III. S.A.C., to carry the heights east and north-east of Pen-hsi-hu; the right, I. S.A.C., to carry the Tu-men-tzu Ling; in reserve the II. S.A.C. The easiest plan for the Russians would have been to act vigorously from the south bank, but as a fact the cavalry did hardly anything.

North of the Tai-tzu Rennenkampf attacked close to the river with the III. S.A.C. moving on his right, but in spite of superior numbers he could in that rugged region make no impression on Umezawa's men. (General Inouye of the 12th Division was really in command, but for convenience I use the name Umezawa.)

Meantime the I. S.A.C. under Gerngross assailed the Ta Ling and Tu-men-tzu Ling, but in spite of their superior numbers the Japanese resistance and the precipitous slopes were too

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much for them—want of maps, inexperience of mountain warfare, and lack of mutual support told against the assailants.

That night, on hearing that the Russian Centre —Mau, Mishchenko, and IV. S.A.C.—had had to retire, Stakelberg issued fresh orders to entrench positions held, to prepare a defensive position near Pien-niu-lu-pu, and to fall on the right flank of the Japanese Guard if that force tried to pursue the IV. S.A.C.

Unlike the Russian Eastern Force the Centre and Western Force stood on the defensive; with Feng-chi-pu as the objective the mass of the 1st Army—Guard on the right, 2nd Division on the left—moved against Mishchenko, the IV. S.A.C., and Mau. The Guard, now under Asada *vice* Hasegawa, moved forward while it was still dark, and repulsed the Russians, *i.e.* Mishchenko, and the left wing of the IV. S.A.C. Round Watanabe Yama severe counter-attacks were delivered by the Russians against the Guard till well on into the afternoon, but on the whole without success; still the Guard had pushed only as far as Watanabe Yama.

As to the 2nd Division it moved against the right wing of the IV. S.A.C. and General Mau; the 3rd Brigade of this division on the right could make no impression on the enemy in the mountainous country near San-cheng-tzu Shan, and had to throw up shelter-trenches, so that

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they all seemed to be underground. The 15th Brigade of this division on the left moving in a flat valley dared not at first assault General Mau's strong position on Temple Hill because both the 4th Army on its left and the 3rd Brigade on its right could make no headway; but at 3.30 p.m. General Okasaki, commanding 15th Brigade, started for Temple Hill, which, after desperate fighting, fell into his hands during the evening—there was a good deal of bayonet work. This success was due to the bad shooting of the Russians, and the speed of the Japanese attack. It would seem as if the 4th Army could then have broken in between the Russian Centre and the left of the X. A.C., and therefore Kuropatkin brought up the I. A.C. so as to support General Mau.

As to the 4th Army, its objective being Liu-fan-tun, it had to turn north-eastwards, and this would bring its right—the 10th Division—against the I. A.C. and General Mau, whilst its left—the 5th Division—would continue to act against the X. A.C. The 10th Division, seeing the strength of the Russians north of Temple Hill, pushed only a slight way forward in that direction during the daytime.

After Solomka's retirement the 5th Division stood fronting the advanced troops of the X. A.C. near Ying-pan, and the advanced troops of the left of the XVII. A.C. at Shih-li-ho. During the

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whole day the mass of the X. A.C. in its new main position at Hung-pao-shan sent hardly any support to its advanced troops near Ying-pan, who with considerable loss maintained their position.

As to the XVII. A.C. it had the III. Infantry Division under Yanjul (Yanzhul) in front in the entrenched position Shih-li-ho—Yen-tao-niu-lu as far as the Sha Ho, with Stakhovich and Grekov on the right to the west of that river; its XXXV. Division stood in second line in the new main position at Chien-liu-tang-kou. The 5th Division could make no impression on the left of the Russian III. Division at Shih-li-ho.

The rest of these Russian troops—General Dembovski on the Hun Ho really did nothing—had to be dealt with by the 2nd Army, which moved 3rd Division on the right against Yen-tao-niu-lu, 6th Division in the centre just east of the Sha Ho, 4th Division and Akiyama on the left west of the Sha Ho. After terrible fighting the 3rd Division succeeded in carrying Yen-tao-niu-lu, which broke in the centre of the Russian III. Division, and therefore Bilderling ordered the XXXV. Division to move up, and retake the place by a night attack. Just east of the Sha Ho moved the 6th Division against the right of the Russian III. Division and Colonel Stakhovich, and though the fighting was severe the Japanese succeeded in getting as far as Yang-chia-wan,

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because the turning movement of the 4th Division compelled Stakhovich to retire northwards along the west bank of the Sha Ho.

The 4th Division on the left acting against Grekov drove him slightly northwards, and thus came into line with the 6th Division; but even Oku's reiterated orders could not induce this division to press on farther—Oku wanted to carry out Oyama's idea of driving the Russians north-eastwards.

On the extreme left watching Chang-tan was Akiyama's 1st Cavalry Brigade, which was entirely neutralised by some advanced troops from Dembovski. Why did not this latter general deliver a resolute attack in this quarter?

Night Operations, October 11–12

At 7 p.m. the battle died down; the Japanese had repulsed Stakelberg, had carried Temple Hill and Yen-tao-niu-lu, but that was all. On their side the Russians had troops in hand, *i.e.* II. S.A.C., I. A.C., VI. S.A.C. under Sobolev—this corps lay entrenched on the right, that is, to the west of the original entrenched Lin-sheng-pu position of the XVII. A.C.—and Dembovski, equal to one-third of the Russian Army, whereas the Japanese had hardly any reserves; only seven and a half battalions with Oku, and in the General Reserve the 5th Division and some Foot Artillery.

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This evening Oyama issued orders for the 12th: the 10th Division of the 4th Army to continue to bend north-eastwards, and to help the 2nd Division of the 1st Army against General Mau and the I. A.C. during the night, and therefore the 3rd and 11th Kobi Brigades and several guns from the General Reserve were sent to the 4th Army, but the 5th Division was to retire and become the General Reserve with some Foot Artillery; 1st Army to hold its positions, 2nd Army to advance as already instructed.

During the night three important events occurred: (1) The XVII. A.C. retook Yen-tao-niu-lu by a well-arranged night assault, in which the bayonet was freely used. Thus the Russian line was re-established. (2) The 4th Army—10th Division, 10th, 3rd, and 11th Kobi Brigades—acting against the I. A.C. and Mau carried San-kuai-shih Shan, a narrow rocky ridge; whilst this attack was being arranged the 5th Division, north of Wu-li-tai-tzu Hill, gradually withdrew from in front of the advanced troops of the X. A.C., and from in front of the left of the XVII. A.C., but it left a detachment under General Yamada on Wu-li-tai-tzu Hill to cover the left of the 4th Army. Then came the night attack on San-kuai-shih Shan; the order was not to fire in any circumstances, and to wear a white band on the left arm. After furious fighting the place fell, and this, with the previous capture of

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Temple Hill by the 15th Brigade, drove a wedge into the Russian Centre. (3) The 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division, acting against the right wing of the IV. S.A.C., carried San-cheng-tzu Shan, and thus at last came into line with the 15th Brigade. Kuropatkin's plan of enveloping the Japanese right had failed.

Shih-li-ho and West of Mandarin Road, October 12

October 12. October 12.—Kuropatkin, still trusting to Stakelberg's offensive, gave up all idea of offensive with his Western Force; he had not been informed by Stakelberg of his real failure. At 6 a.m., in view of Oku's attack in the west, Kuropatkin directed Bilderling to retire into the main position of Chien-liu-tang-kou—Hung-pao-shan; as the Japanese were just attacking the XVII. A.C. and Stakhovich could not obey, but the X. A.C. unfortunately prepared to obey.

On the other side Oku's 2nd Army with its objective still Lin-sheng-pu prepared to facilitate the turning movement of the 4th Army, Akiyama's cavalry doing little else but watch Grekov and Dembovski. The 4th Division moving west of the Sha Ho and against Stakhovich, Grekov, and the leading troops of the VI. S.A.C. with difficulty reached a line on a level with Chien-liu-tang-kou, driving the enemy northwards.

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Some weak counter-attacks by the VI. S.A.C. on the left of the 4th Division followed, but were easily repulsed with the help of Akiyama's cavalry.

The XVII. A.C., now reinforced by part of the VI. S.A.C., still held the Yen-tao-niu-lu position, whence it could not retire, as above explained; against this force moved the Japanese 6th and 3rd Divisions, their artillery fire being superior to that of the defence. The fighting was stubborn, the Russians adopting old-fashioned close formations, but the Japanese captured Yen-tao-niu-lu, and drove the Russians northwards on Chien-liu-tang-kou. In this affair the 6th Division operated between the Sha Ho and Yen-tao-niu-lu, *i.e.* against the right of the XVII. A.C., the 3rd Division across the railway against the last village and Shih-li-ho, *i.e.* against the left of the XVII. A.C. On the right of this division stood the Yamada detachment of the 4th Army. It was the 3rd Division which carried Yen-tao-niu-lu and also Shih-li-ho, acting with great tactical skill. The effect on the Russians was crushing; in utter confusion the XVII. A.C. fled, abandoning the main position of Chien-liu-tang-kou, and, crossing the Sha Ho at Ta-kuai-chi-pu (Han-kuei-pu), formed up in the original position at Lin-sheng-pu, having in front on the west bank of the Sha Ho Stakhovich's detachment, and having on the right flank the VI. S.A.C., with Grekov's

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cavalry in its front; Dembovski, as before, near the Hun Ho.

As to the Japanese they did not really pursue, and contented themselves with reaching a line running west to east through Chien-liu-tang-kou, Akiyama facing Dembovski, 4th Division facing Grekov and Stakhovich, west of the Sha Ho; 6th Division at Chien-liu-tang-kou, with 3rd Division on its right, east of the Sha Ho.

East of Mandarin Road, October 12

East of the Mandarin Road between Oku's right and the 4th Army on San-kuai-shih Shan stood only the Yamada detachment, opposed by the X. A.C., which held the entrenched lines of Shih-li-ho—Ying-pan, and Hung-pao-shan. Owing to Kuropatkin's usual habit of sending orders not only to the commanders of great masses but also to the commanders of individual army corps General Sluchevski, commanding X. A.C., had several contradictory orders during the morning, and when it became clear that the XVII. A.C. was giving way the X. A.C. abandoned its advanced position Shih-li-ho—Ying-pan, and fell back into its main position Hung-pao-shan with little loss, though followed by Yamada, who formed up on the right of the 2nd Army. After various orders from Kuropatkin and Bilderling Sluchevski during the night withdrew into the

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old position at Sha-ho-pu in line with the XVII. A.C.

More to the east the mass of the 4th Army and the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division were opposed to General Mau and the I. A.C.—Mau was holding Nan Shan and Lo-ta Shan, but was compelled to evacuate the former position. The latter position, however, he held against all the Japanese assaults.

Still more to the east the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division was acting against the right wing of the IV. S.A.C., and, passing at a great speed over the fire-swept zone, drove the enemy back into a line with Mau's Lo-ta Shan position.

Still more to the east the Guard, acting against the left of the IV. S.A.C. and Mishchenko, moved very early in the morning—3.30 a.m.—carrying the slopes round Watanabe Yama, and driving the enemy back into line with General Mau. Kuroki being informed that the 4th Army had succeeded more than it had, and knowing that the 12th Division and Umezawa were hard pressed, directed Matsunaga's 3rd Brigade to proceed to their help.

Meantime Kuropatkin, having now in hand only half the I. A.C., was corresponding with Stakelberg as to whether the latter should send his reserve, the II. S.A.C., to the support of the IV. S.A.C., and he actually sent directions to Stakelberg's subordinate without consulting that officer. In the end Kuropatkin came to the

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conclusion that he must call on the half of the I. A.C., *i.e.* the XXII. Division, to reinforce the IV. S.A.C., which it accordingly did by moving up in rear of the Ho-ma-tang position. In the end the II. S.A.C. stood still in its old position at Pien-niu-lu-pu.

This day very early Stakelberg delivered his final attacks on the passes with his I. S.A.C. and III. S.A.C., who, using hand-grenades, resolutely attacked; but all the assaults failed, and at 10 a.m. the arrival from Chiao-tou of Prince Kanin's 2nd Cavalry Brigade with machine guns at Pen-hsi-hu on the south bank settled the question, and by nightfall the Russian Eastern Force was in retreat.

Situation on the Evening of October 12

The Russians had failed, Oyama held the initiative; the Russian Western Force had been hurled back, the Eastern Force was in retreat, the Centre was holding a dangerous salient, but in the matter of reserves the Russians still had the larger number. That night Oyama issued his orders for the 13th: the Japanese armies should pursue the enemy as far as the left bank of the Sha Ho.

October 13. October 13.—So defective was the Russian intercommunication that it was not till the morning of the 13th that Kuropatkin learnt the real truth, and thus realised the peril in which the Russian

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Centre (IV. S.A.C., I. A.C., Mau, and Mishchenko) was placed. He does not seem to have grasped the danger of the Japanese, namely, that the II. S.A.C. might assail the right flank of the Japanese Guard. He therefore reluctantly abandoned the offensive.

Already Stakelberg was in retreat; Inouye, *i.e.* 12th Division, and Umezawa, was in no condition to pursue, and the only danger to the Russians arose from Matsunaga's Brigade, which was coming on to Chao-hsien Ling, where it found itself stopped by the rearguard of the I. S.A.C.; as a link between Matsunaga and the Guard stood Colonel Kasa's cavalry—Guard Cavalry and 2nd Cavalry Regiment. Thus Kuroki failed to cut Stakelberg's retreat, and his weakening of his left in order to try this put him in serious danger.

To cover his retreat Stakelberg delivered a well-planned counter-attack with his II. S.A.C. on the exposed right flank of the Japanese Guard, which attack, if driven home, might have had great results—Matsunaga might have been annihilated, and the Guard would have been in a nasty position—but the knowledge that a retreat was already in progress damped the commander.

All this time the Japanese Guard was acting against the left of the IV. S.A.C. and Mishchenko eastwards of the Ho-ma-tang; the Japanese attacks were roughly repulsed, and the Guard was

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in a perilously advanced position, especially as the II. S.A.C. then delivered its counter-stroke. But the 5th Division, Oyama's reserve, was at once sent to the 1st Army, and the Russians did not press on, and the danger passed.

More to the west Okasaki's 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division had to deal with General Mau and the right wing of the IV. S.A.C. in the Lo-ta Shan position, which was carried after desperate fighting, the attackers being much helped by the very steepness of the height. This capture and the general decision of Kuropatkin to retire caused the IV. S.A.C. and General Mau to fall back on Feng-chi-pu, covered by Mishchenko.

Round Mang-chia-fen the mass of the 4th Army with its units much broken up was operating against the I. A.C., but there was little fighting, as the I. A.C. under General Meiendorf gradually withdrew to the left of the X. A.Corps' position at Sha-ho-pu.

In the west this day was occupied almost entirely by artillery fire, the X. A.C. reorganising in its Sha-ho-pu position, faced now by Oku's right, the 3rd Division, which, shifting to the right, took the place of the Yamada detachment; the XVII. A.C., joined by Colonel Stakhovich, also reorganised in the Lin-sheng-pu position, with the VI. S.A.C.—Grekov's cavalry in front—écheloned on its right rear: this last corps as well as Dembovski was this day put under

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Bilderling, which should have been done some days before. Farther to the west and nearer to the Hun Ho came Dembovski. These forces, XVII. A.C., VI. S.A.C., and Dembovski, were faced by Koizumi's detachment from the 6th Division, the 4th Division, and Akiyama's cavalry.

It should be noted that the Japanese were gradually shifting eastwards, that Oyama, having sent to the 1st Army his reserve, the 5th Division, recalled the Yamada detachment, and that Oku transferred his 6th Division from his centre to his right wing so as to help Nodzu's 4th Army against the I. A.C.—the two armies were thus brought into connection.

This day, the 13th, saw the Japanese right safe, with Stakelberg in retreat before it, the Japanese Guard saved from a risky position, the long retreat of Zarubaiev's IV. S.A.C. to Feng-chi-pu, which endangered the I. A.C.; on the other hand, Bilderling had reorganised, and Dembovski was very threatening to the 4th Division. This day the Japanese 8th Division arrived at Liao-yang.

Japanese Advance to the Sha Ho, October 14

All night, 13th to 14th, the Russian Eastern Force was retiring in the direction of Pien-niu-lu-pu on the Sha Ho, whilst the IV. S.A.C., Mishchenko, and Mau were making for Feng- October 14.

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chi-pu on the Sha Ho—the rest of the Russians did not move in the night.

Kuroki despatched his right wing—5th Division, Matsunaga's 3rd Brigade, 12th Division, and Umezawa—in pursuit of Stakelberg as far as the south bank of the Sha Ho, to the north of which the Russian general retired, sending, by Kuropatkin's order, a considerable force towards Feng-chi-pu to assist the IV. S.A.C. Kuroki also moved his Guard and Okasaki's 15th Brigade more in the direction of Feng-chi-pu, fighting severe rearguard actions with Mishchenko. Henceforth the Japanese 1st Army and the Russian Eastern Force did nothing for some time.

In the Russian Centre the retreat of the IV. S.A.C. and of Mau had left the I. A.C. in peril, and against it Oyama launched the 4th Army (10th Division, two Kobi Brigades, and most of the 6th Division), with the result that the I. A.C. was routed, and, covered by a tempest, fled across the Sha Ho.

Meantime in the 2nd Army the 3rd Division, moving against the X. A.C. in its Sha-ho-pu position, carried the advanced post of Kan-chia-la-tzu, and pushed as far as Sha-ho-pu, but could get no farther—here fell that able Russian general, Ryabinkin, commander of the advanced troops of the X. A.C. General Kuropatkin realised his danger, and saw that it was vital that the Japanese should not get hold of Putilov

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Hill and One Tree Hill, which would outflank the X. A.C. and XVII. A.C. as well as the IV. S.A.C. He therefore gathered what troops he could, mainly of the I. A.C., and delivered a serious counter-attack on the right of the 3rd Division, which, however, with the help of the 6th Division, managed to hold its own, and in the end the southern part of Sha-ho-pu village remained in Japanese hands.

All this time Koizumi's mixed brigade was acting near Lin-sheng-pu against the left of the XVII. A.C., and after a terrible struggle, the 4th Division helping, the place fell. While this was going on there developed a serious threat against the 4th Division and Akiyama, *i.e.* the advance of the VI. S.A.C. and Dembovski: the tactics of the VI. S.A.C. were antiquated in the extreme, without any attempt at extension, and as on a peace parade, tactics watched by the Japanese with astonishment. In the end this Russian corps was repulsed, but it had assisted the XVII. A.C. The operations of Dembovski and Grekov in the extreme west displayed great weakness, and were easily held in check by Akiyama.

This day saw the Russians driven north of the Sha Ho except at La-mu-tun, One Tree Hill, and Putilov Hill; the Russian extreme right had acted very weakly. Marshal Marquis Oyama next prepared to advance to the Hun Ho.

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Capture of Putilov and One Tree Hills, October 15 *and* 16

October 15. October 15.—Kuropatkin now had no reserve, and apparently only two courses remained open to him: (1) Dembovski and Grekov to assail the Japanese left; (2) Kuropatkin preferred to create fresh field defences south of Pao-chia-a-tzu, and to collect there a fresh reserve, *i.e.* the force that Stakelberg had sent to help the IV. S.A.C., parts of the I. A.C. and IV. S.A.C., total 20,000, whilst General Mau joined his X. A.C. again at the same place.

Oyama then restored his troops as far as possible to their original commands, *e.g.* 3rd Kobi Brigade became the General Reserve, 5th Division returned from the 1st Army to the 4th Army, 3rd Brigade returned to the 2nd Division, that is, rejoined the 15th Brigade, Kuroki's right was formed by the 12th Division and 5th Kobi Brigade, Umezawa's Guard Kobi Brigade then forming Kuroki's reserve.

In the quarter occupied by the 2nd Army the 3rd Division, worn out by the Sha-ho-pu fighting, could do nothing against Putilov Hill, and so the 4th Army had to help by sending the Yamada detachment (reattached to this army) and the 10th Kobi Brigade, which two forces rushed the hill against the I. A.C. troops.

Meantime the Russian XVII. A.C. delivered

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a serious counter-stroke at Lin-sheng-pu against Koizumi; their tactics were, as so often, old-fashioned, and failed. La-mu-tun also was wrested from the XVII. A.C. by the combined 6th Division, that is, including Koizumi, the Russian commander, Colonel Martuinov, owing to a confusion of orders, retiring into the new line south of Pao-chia-a-tzu just as the Japanese attacked. Martuinov has been severely blamed for his hurried retreat.

As for the VI. S.A.C. General Sobolev, taught by his disasters of the 12th and 14th, did nothing, nor did his opponent, the commander of the 4th Division; but in any case we must blame the inactivity of Grekov and Dembovski, who, instead of overlapping the 4th Division, seemed intent only on retreat.

Russian correspondence at this time shows how confused were the reports that reached General Kuropatkin, and how conflicting in consequence were the orders, but he still thought of the offensive with the Western Force and his new Reserve.

October 16.—On the extreme right of the Japanese 1st Army Prince Kanin's 2nd Cavalry Brigade reconnoitred against the left of Stakelberg, *i.e.* the III. S.A.C. and Samsonov; but the 1st Army did nothing more. The 4th Army (Yamada's force), however, captured One Tree Hill. The loss of this hill and the previous loss October 16.

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of Putilov Hill destroyed any idea of a general Russian attack; besides, Kuropatkin now learnt that Bilderling's force was seriously reduced in strength. He accordingly confined his attention to the recapture of One Tree Hill and Putilov Hill, held by Yamada; for this purpose he detailed General Gerngross with the newly formed Russian Reserve. Yamada was seriously threatened, his right flank in the air, the river in front giving no real protection. He could get no help, and decided to hold his ground till night, and then slip away in the dark, but before the time fixed for his withdrawal the Russians came on, and succeeded in capturing One Tree Hill, which, however, they evacuated, because in the darkness they began firing on one another.

On Putilov Hill so furious was the assault under the distinguished officer, Colonel Zapolski—here killed—that the place was captured, and Yamada fell back towards Kan-chia-la-tzu. Some hours later during the night the Russians carried One Tree Hill, otherwise called Novgorod Hill.

All this time the 3rd Division held the perilous position in the southern part of Sha-ho-pu, opposite to the X. A.C.; the 6th Division likewise stood opposite to the XVII. A.C.

In the extreme west Sobolev's VI. S.A.C. and Dembovski's detachment, in ignorance that Kuropatkin had postponed his general attack, moved against the 4th Division and Akiyama; the

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operation was half-hearted, and on learning that the general attack was postponed both Russian forces retired. Akiyama, acting as protective cavalry throughout the battle, suffered little, which was due to the incapacity of the Russians, and henceforth, at least during this period, we hear no more of the ill-led troops of Sobolev and Dembovski.

Last of the Battle, October 17. *Winter Quarters*

The battle was really over, but the optimistic Kuropatkin still believed in a counter-attack. He proposed to act with the I. A.C. and X. A.C. against the Japanese 3rd Division in the southern part of Sha-ho-pu, but the attack was postponed, and on October 18 finally abandoned. October 17. October 18.

October 19.—Kuropatkin issued a memorandum stating what he believed were the positions and numbers of the respective armies, and a few days later the recall of Viceroy Alexeiev left him in supreme control (October 27). October 19.

Both sides then reorganised, the Japanese waiting for the fall of Port Arthur and the arrival of Nogi's troops, for at present their numbers were insufficient for complete victory. Winter quarters were therefore arranged on the banks of the Sha Ho till the end of February, 1905—a period broken only by Mishchenko's raid, and by the Battle of Hei-kou-tai in January, 1905.

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The Russians stood thus from the west—Kossakovski, Grekov, Dembovski, VI. S.A.C., XVII. A.C., X. A.C., Gerngross's troops on Putilov and One Tree Hills, I. A.C., I. S.A.C., IV. S.A.C., Mishchenko, Stakelberg's Eastern Force (II. S.A.C., III. S.A.C.), covered on the left by Samsonov's cavalry, and still farther eastwards by Rennenkampf and Madritov. Their front extended from the Liao Ho eastwards past Pien-niu-lu-pu, north of the Sha Ho except at south Sha-ho-pu, which Oku had evacuated, Putilov Hill, One Tree Hill, and Liu-chiang-tun. Their defence was elaborate, trenches, redoubts, mines, etc., all built solely for defence, unlike the Japanese works, which were to help offensive action.

The Japanese held a corresponding position from the east of Pien-niu-lu-pu to the west of the railway and of the Sha Ho, all south of that stream except at Lin-sheng-pu and La-mu-tun: 1st Army, *i.e.* 2nd Cavalry Brigade, 5th Kobi Brigade, 12th Division, Guard, 2nd Division, Umezawa's mixed brigade; 4th Army, *i.e.* 11th Kobi Brigade, 10th Division, Yamada's detachment, 10th Kobi Brigade, 5th Division; 2nd Army, *i.e.* 3rd Division, 6th Division, 4th Division, Akiyama's cavalry; in rear the 8th Division, and a Kobi Brigade. Trenches were constructed with wire entanglements, etc., and excellent arrangements made for food, fuel, and clothing. The

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position of the combatants was like that of Grant and Lee in 1864.

The Russian losses were 45 guns and over 40,000 men, the Japanese 14 guns and over 20,000 men.

COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE

Neither had completely succeeded, but the Russians had failed much more than the Japanese; with his eye on Port Arthur, Kuropatkin had meant to reach the Tai-tzu Ho, but he had not done so, though he no doubt rejoiced that his Eastern Force now protected the Fu-shun coal-mines, and rendered difficult any turning movement by the Japanese towards Tieh-ling. Oyama had likewise failed to drive any part of the enemy from his communications, but had seriously damaged his moral.

For each commander the Hun Ho and the mountains complicated the problem; Kuropatkin was right in taking the offensive, but he did not conceal his intention—his plan was to envelop the Japanese right, which was in the air, but this course would involve acting in mountainous country, unsuitable to the Russians, and by it to push the Japanese off the railway would be difficult. Therefore it would seem as if Kuropatkin should have enveloped the Japanese left, because this course would involve level country, suitable for the Cossacks, and would more easily

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cut the railway, whilst the Hun Ho, not much of an obstacle, was no real protection to Oyama's flank. However that may be, Kuropatkin decided on attacking the enemy's right, but he did not act with energy. Stakelberg's task would have been easier if he had been based on Fu-shun, and the whole Russian position had the same defect as the French position at Spicheren, 1870—half in a plain, and half in the mountains.

Kuropatkin seemed always thinking of retreat—*e.g.* of his eight army corps he retained three at his own disposal, and so the Eastern and Western Forces were not strong enough, especially the Eastern Force, which had to do the real work. He then placed his General Reserve between the two groups, and used it only with reluctance; it would have been better to give the I. A.C. to the Western Force, and the IV. S.A.C. to the Eastern Force, and to retain the VI. S.A.C. as his own reserve. But the Russians never would stake their last man on success.

Kuropatkin could have made up for his error in the original arrangement of his troops if only he had ordered the Western Force to attack as Frederick Charles attacked at Königgrätz, 1866; instead, he moved it slowly from position to position—note this trust in positions. The Eastern Force should have had more men south of the Tai-tzu Ho, whence they could have effectually dealt with Pen-hsi-hu. Both Kuro-

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patkin and Stakelberg were too cautious, and thus Umezawa escaped.

The Western Force was too defensive; it should by attacking have pinned the Japanese left, and thus prevented the Japanese right from being reinforced, though it is true that it was not till October 13 that Oyama did so reinforce his 1st Army with the 5th Division, but the Russians could not have been sure of this delay.

On October 9 Stakelberg, contrary to Kuropatkin's wish, attacked vigorously, and there was a chance, but he lost it by inaction on October 10; and next day, October 11, in spite of the non-massing of his guns, the heroism of his men would have given him the victory if only he had used his reserve south of the Tai-tzu, or against Umezawa's front. As it was, October 11 was a failure, and on October 12 he should have gone on with his attack, but he feared for his right flank, uncovered, as he thought, by the impending retirement of the IV. S.A.C., though he must have known Kuropatkin had reserves to take care of this right flank of his. In any case he should have immediately told Kuropatkin of his intention to discontinue the attack. He was over-anxious for his flanks, as were all Russian commanders, *e.g.* he kept the II. S.A.C. on his right, which never was in danger.

As to the Western Force, though it had from the first allowed itself to be forced into the

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defensive it could on October 11, aided by the I. A.C. and the IV. S.A.C. on the east and by the VI. S.A.C. and Dembovski on the west, have assumed the offensive, especially acting against the Japanese left. Why did not Kuropatkin or Bilderling use the VI. S.A.C. and Dembovski to roll up the Japanese left? Why did Kuropatkin on the night of October 9–10 tell Sobolev, "Remember you are my strategic reserve"—fatal to all initiative?

From October 11 Kuropatkin did nothing but meet momentary tactical wants; it is true, of course, that on October 12 the Russian Centre was pressed, but Kuropatkin, instead of meeting this danger with the still available half of the I. A.C., called on Stakelberg for troops, that is, on the man who was to do the real work. In fact, the whole correspondence between the two generals is most curious.

On October 11 the Russians could have enveloped both Japanese wings; October 12 still gave a chance; October 13 defeat was certain, and then it was that Kuropatkin decided on an offensive with his Western Force and a new Reserve—an offensive that led to nothing except the capture of Putilov and One Tree Hills.

The battle was lost because the reserve was too large, the attack half-hearted, and prematurely abandoned. Kuropatkin was right to form two separate forces of his immense army; but he was

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wrong in sending orders direct to corps commanders instead of to Bilderling or Stakelberg. The communication between him and his subordinates took many hours, and he tried to direct everything, *e.g.* he told his generals to collect fodder for the horses, etc. His mania for forming fresh reserves constantly broke up units—this was the cause of the loss of Sha-ho-pu on October 14, and the troops of four different corps shared in the attack on Putilov and One Tree Hills. The Russian soldiers personally deserve high praise.

After Liao-yang the Japanese had not pursued because they had lost more men, were fatigued, and had little ammunition or food; they would, however, have gained much by pursuit, and should at least have tried it. Once having let the Russians escape, it was wise to stop and reorganise, for as the command of the sea was not absolute, there was always uncertainty about reinforcements, etc.—*e.g.* they had hoped to see Nogi in the field, but he was held by Port Arthur, and so they sent the 8th Division, but too late. Thus they were inferior on the Sha Ho.

Oyama met the Russian attack by defensive-offensive tactics as recommended by Moltke; and his counter-attack was meant to push the Russians north-eastwards away from Mukden and Tieh-ling—in fact, the 2nd and 4th Armies were to swing on the pivot of the 1st Army, but the

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peculiarity was that the 2nd Army was to keep strong forces on its right flank. Now it is clear that Oyama's object could be gained only by an attack on the Russian right, and the Japanese were too committed to battle to do this, nor had they numbers enough, and the keeping of strong forces on the 2nd Army's right was dead against Oyama's object—they should have been on that army's left. General Kodama explained this by saying that he hoped to pierce the Russian front on the Mandarin road, and then, with the strong forces on the right of the 2nd Army, either act against the left of the enemy on the Mandarin road, or act against the right of the enemy at Feng-chi-pu; therefore the Japanese aimed at envelopment and penetration at the same time. The fact is that the 2nd Army could not swing round enough for envelopment. They had not enough numbers for it, and certainly not enough for penetration as well—compare Wagram, 1809; Napoleon tried both at the same time, and succeeded only in the envelopment. Even if the strong forces had been on the left of the 2nd Army there would have been no envelopment, because the Russians had there the VI. S.A.C. and Dembovski, which really endangered the Japanese left, whilst their right was always in peril—briefly they had not numbers enough.

The right wing was asked to do too much, and was saved only by the Russians not acting

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in strength south of the Tai-tzu. It was, of course, the desperate fighting of this extreme right, holding fast three Russian army corps, that enabled the rest of the Japanese to meet on equal terms the rest of the Russians, and even to try an enveloping movement against the Russian right; at that moment (October 11) Oyama was probably ignorant of the VI. S.A.C. and Dembovski. It was these two forces that stopped the wheeling movement both of the 2nd Army and of the 4th Army, October 12.

Oyama therefore gave up all idea of driving the Russians north-eastwards away from Mukden, and decided only to reach the southern bank of the Sha Ho. It was a hard decision to take, for it meant postponing the issue of the war, and yet was prudent. He did, however, try to punish the enemy before they could reach the Sha Ho, *e.g.* he moved the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Division, from the left to the right of the 1st Army, and with it tried to cut off those of Stakelberg's troops that were opposite Umezawa, but the numbers were insufficient; again, when the retreat of the X. A.C. on Sha-ho-pu, October 12, laid open the right of the I. A.C., Oyama had not the numbers with the 4th Army to take advantage of this because he just then (October 13) sent off the 5th Division to help the 1st Army. This sending away of the 5th Division was an error.

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The initiative is usually considered an advantage, but it is said to be a disadvantage in three cases: (1) where there is a desert; (2) where there are parallel rivers; (3) in such a case as the Sha Ho, where frontal fighting was far more practicable, strategic manœuvre being hampered by the restricted front, the huge numbers, and the entrenchments.

On the lack of pursuit in modern wars Goltz says it is due to exhaustion, dispersal of troops, range of enemy's guns, and feelings of humanity, and in this case we add want of cavalry.

Advanced Positions.—Balck in his "Tactics" says they are bad, but at the Sha Ho allowable for the Western Force, because it wanted to give Stakelberg time; but their excessive reinforcement and the constant changes in orders were fatal.

Necessity of Topographical Knowledge.—Note that the Japanese felt the want of a good map, as also did the Russians; Umezawa's exposed position at Pien-niu-lu-pu was due to topographical ignorance, and Stakelberg was hampered by the same cause.

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CHAPTER VII

GENERAL COMMENTS

SHOULD the Japanese have masked or besieged Port Arthur? From a military point of view no doubt the correct thing was to mask, because that course would have enabled a larger force to move against Kuropatkin; but Port Arthur was not a Metz, it was a naval fortress, and the justification for the siege is that it was absolutely necessary to capture the Russian fleet before the latter could be joined by the Baltic Fleet. It is also obvious that, if Port Arthur had been merely masked, Kuropatkin would have had a freer hand, and it is probable that the small numbers Oyama had at Liao-yang were due quite as much to supply difficulties as to the siege. There was also the political importance of the place.

Let us now look at the question from the Russian point of view. Whether fortresses are wise or not, it is clear that they can easily be overrated; they should be subordinated to the field army, and should be used to assist the

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offensive action of a mobile army or of a sea-going fleet. If the Russian fleet had been active and victorious, there would have been no need to discuss the question at all, but in the actual circumstances the Russians had two courses open —either to retain the fortress in strength, as they did, or to evacuate it early in the war.

In favour of the former course, Admiral Mahan and others have urged that it retained large numbers of the enemy, as in the case of Ladysmith. It sheltered the Russian fleet, it enabled the Vladivostok vessels to prey on Japanese commerce, it gave Russia time to hurry up the Baltic Fleet, it delayed Oku's northward march, and the place possessed great political value.

In favour of the latter course, Dragomirof advised early evacuation, because it would mean the fleet issuing and fighting a desperate battle, in which either Togo would be beaten, or at least damaged—and Togo was Russia's real foe. If this advice had been followed, then the precedent of 1812 could have been acted upon. Whether Kuropatkin included in his original plan of retreat the early evacuation of Port Arthur, I do not know, but it is obvious that, as long as Port Arthur remained occupied by a Russian garrison, no such retreating policy could have been pursued. If only Kuropatkin could beat the Japanese armies, he would inevitably recover the fortress, and its early evacuation would have facilitated a

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victory—*e.g.* its troops on the Ya-lu would have beaten Kuroki. As to sheltering the fleet till the Baltic Fleet should arrive, the argument fails, because the latter fleet could not possibly get there in time. The fortress was a fatal snare for the Russian fleet and a fatal magnet for Kuropatkin. No doubt it contained a force larger than the garrison, but, as a fact, a smaller force might have invested it.

Tactical.—We note the necessity of the spade in attack, and also of entrenching as you advance, and of practising night movements; the frequency of frontal assaults, even on a grand scale; and the wisdom of concealing guns and entrenchments.

We note also constant usage of railways—*e.g.* the Russians retreated by railway, and frequently laid down light railways. The whole war favours the tactical offensive, pure and simple, which is against Moltke's defensive-offensive idea of tactics, although the German view can certainly be supported by the fact that modern arms favour the tactical defensive.

As to infantry, we find hand-to-hand fighting, bayonet charges, frontal attacks in dense masses, *e.g.* at Liao-yang, and night attacks. The Russian infantry held fast to the belief in the old-fashioned volley and in the bayonet. They were bad in mountain fighting, where the offensive has great advantages; they indulged too much in passive

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defence, never thinking of counter-attack; and held back their reserves, whereas the Japanese brought up every man. Their retreats were skilful, but had a bad moral effect. They put too much trust in entrenchments; and Shevtsov, the Russian author, comments on their defective tactical training.

They foolishly trusted to defensive positions—the "positionist heresy" of the eighteenth century, and of Benedek in 1866—and then in counter-attacking with the bayonet, whereas the only real method to meet modern weapons is by mobility. "To march and attack by night, to shelter in earthworks by day, is the only way to meet modern firearms" (de Négrier).

The Japanese infantry, animated by Bushido, the knightly spirit, displayed extraordinary endurance, but even they found barbed wire and machine-guns terrible obstacles. Their usual tactics were an enveloping attack in equal force at all points, using all reserves early, which would have been dangerous if the Russians had used counter-strokes in strength, *e.g.* at Te-li-ssu. Even on the offensive, they employed rough shelter-trenches. The Japanese at first objected, as the Germans do, to night operations, but afterwards altered their opinion; and in such operations they insisted on silence, forbade firing and the use of artillery, and trusted to the bayonet and hand-grenades, and night operations were

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common. It should be noted that the Japanese do not excel at signalling—they rely on the telegraph, as Continental armies of Europe do.

As to cavalry, few lessons can be learnt, because both sides misused their cavalry. The Russian horsemen were too much on foot, and, indeed, there was hardly any mounted fighting with sword or lance. But one must not ignore the pronounced opinions of the French general de Négrier, who holds that the Cossacks failed because they were bad shots, and because their guns were of no avail against villages and field entrenchments. They should have light mortars and howitzers, should carry rifles and bayonets, and should fight on foot, as the Japanese horsemen fought at Te-li-ssu; the so-called "cavalry spirit" must disappear.

As to artillery, the Japanese used extensive artillery preparation, concealed their guns not on the heights, but behind them; their guns were, however, on the whole, inferior to their opponents', and they had no horse artillery. The Japanese had a great superiority in mountain-guns, and though they hid and scattered their guns they concentrated their fire by means of the telephone. Although at the Sha Ho the Russian guns were better, the Japanese skill in using cover minimised their losses. Gun-shields were seen to be a necessity. General de Négrier remarks, "Heavy guns, mortars, and machine-guns are indispensable; artillery is the dominant

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factor by day, infantry can seldom act effectively except by night."

Strategic.—As to cavalry, we note very little pursuit by the Japanese, and the want of cavalry robbed them of the fruits of victory. This failure to pursue has been assigned not only to lack of horsemen, but also to fatigue, and to excess of caution. We note also the total failure of the Russian cavalry to do anything; they were nearly all Cossacks, who are ill-trained and of little use, and they never could pierce the screen of mixed detachments which veiled the advance of the Japanese columns. The Japanese service of security formed by these mixed detachments occupied villages, which the Cossacks could not carry because they had no bayonets, and their guns were not good enough.

The whole war is in favour of the strategic offensive, for the Japanese triumph was largely due to their initiative as well as to the hearty co-operation of fleet and army. So great is the effect of initiative that even the defender should always aim at counter-strokes—a thing which Kuropatkin did not practise. The Japanese three armies on a wide arc of concentration, with all the dangers that menaced Moltke's wide arc of concentration in 1866, converged on Liao-yang and the Russian army, thus breaking Napoleon's rule, "Never concentrate under the beard of the enemy," and, worse still, they did this with

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inferior numbers. This form of strategy was probably compulsory on the Japanese owing to the roads, but a double primary objective such as the Japanese made of Port Arthur and Kuropatkin's Army is generally inadvisable unless you have far superior numbers. In this case it made the Japanese too weak in both places. A safer plan would have been to move against Kuropatkin, then retire, and compel him to fight in a place of their own choosing, *i.e.* strategic offensive and tactical defensive, which is sometimes alleged to be what Oyama succeeded in doing at the Sha Ho. The Russian Commander-in-Chief failed, indeed, to take advantage of his enemy's dangerous position, as Benedek failed in 1866—he was too anxious for his communications; he should have taken the offensive during the end of July, holding Kuroki, and massing against the two other armies, or *vice versâ*. He had plenty of time, for the Japanese were very slow, owing either to supply difficulties, or to a hope that the fall of Port Arthur would enable Nogi to arrive. The Army of the Ussuri (Linevich)—two Infantry divisions and twenty squadrons—should have reinforced Kuropatkin when in the end of June the enemy's plan became clear; the fortress fascinated them. The success of the Japanese was due not to strategic skill, but to "moral," and to the sluggishness of the Russian commander. Whether that general was, or was not,

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a free agent we do not know; but we do know that he committed errors in abandoning Zasulich on the Ya-lu, in sending Stakelberg southwards, in not taking advantage of Japanese dispersion when moving over the mountains into the Liao valley, and in permitting the defeat at Liao-yang. Immersed in detail, he was not a great leader.

The soundest predictions with regard to this war appeared in British and United States publications, and the most unsound in German publications. The Germans, whose military predictions have not of late come up to their reputation, consistently backed Russia, possibly because her absorption in the Far East would relieve them of the nightmare of a war on a double front. The German Official Account pronounces against the wisdom of an early evacuation of Port Arthur, and of a repetition of 1812, mainly because the population would not have acted as in that year, and because of the political effect of a Russian retreat. The German Official Account also considers that Oyama should not have pushed so many troops through Korea, because they could, by landing in South Manchuria, have caused Zasulich to retire from the Ya-lu, and because they would, by landing earlier, have found Port Arthur weaker. They thus lost time through excess of caution, and the political desire to occupy Korea. These German opinions

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are not necessarily sound, *e.g.* the South Manchurian coast is not free from ice till March 15, and French criticism is more favourable to Japan.

Excessive caution is constantly attributed to the Japanese, and was caused by financial considerations; Japan had to pay heavy rates for loans, and any reverse would have frightened the financiers. Besides, the command of the sea was not absolute. Probably they were too cautious.

This war deserves consideration as being one between an island power and a great continental state, and as displaying the conditions of modern naval warfare; and its result may have far-reaching effects on the position of every European power governing Asiatic peoples. The causes leading to the victory of the Eastern power were "moral" and intelligence, and an excellent medical service; whilst the cause leading to the defeat of the Western power was want of "moral" and intelligence, to which the Russian author, Cheremisov, adds defective tactical training, constant interference with subordinates, absence of initiative, passive defence, and failure to surprise.

Russia was not prepared for this war, whereas Japan was thoroughly ready, though we cannot but blame her for not despatching her 7th and 8th Divisions to the seat of war, and for not landing troops in July at Ying-kou, whence they could have converged on Liao-yang.

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In conclusion, it may be remarked that the combatants fought out their quarrel in another country's territory, that both observed the honourable customs of war, that the medical services were good, that Press representatives were restricted by both sides, and that several international questions arose affecting maritime war, *e.g.* floating mines, neutrals supplying coal to a belligerent fleet, sojourn of a belligerent fleet in neutral waters, wounded sailors taking refuge on neutral warships, how far from the seat of war a neutral vessel can be searched for contraband, and numerous cases of contraband—Russia apparently declining to recognise any distinction between absolute and conditional contraband. Although, on these matters, the decisions of the Vladivostok Court were often indefensible, I believe that no objection can be taken to the decisions given on appeal by the High Court at St. Petersburg. Recently (1909), by the Declaration of London, Sir E. Grey has attempted to settle many vexed questions of maritime war, but with what success remains to be seen.

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

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APPENDIX

WITH the subjects of Port Arthur and the Baltic Fleet I find I cannot satisfactorily deal until the second volume of the "Naval and Military Account" appears.

August 13.—Admiral Rozhdestvensky assumed command of Baltic Fleet.

October 15.—Baltic Fleet left Libau.

October 21–22.—Baltic Fleet fired on Hull fishing-boats.

August 27–31.—Fresh assaults on Port Arthur.

September 19–23.—Second general assault on Port Arthur. Capture of Fort Kuropatkin. Assault on 203 Mètre Hill.

October 16.—Assault on Port Arthur.

October 26.—Third general assault.

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LIST OF QUESTIONS

1. Give a general description of the theatre of operations.
2. Estimate the tactical and strategic work of cavalry in this war.
3. Sketch the causes of the war.
4. Discuss the Port Arthur question from the Japanese and the Russian standpoint.
5. Comment on the action of the infantry on both sides.
6. Show why pursuit is more difficult than, say, in 1806.
7. On September 3 Kuropatkin decided to retreat on Mukden. Examine the situation, and suggest another course.
8. Consider Kuropatkin's leading at the Sha Ho battle.
9. Show the change of ideas that passed through Oyama's mind as to the conduct of the Sha Ho battle.
10. Consider the use and abuse of entrenchments in a modern battle.
11. "Frontal assaults are out of date." Comment on his.

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